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There is at least some consistency to the worst stories about U.S. actions in Iraq:
Low level guards who are hardly more than thugs--some of them probably having been brutalized by working as guards in U.S. prisons (Marshall and The Corner)--are either given a free hand with prisoners, which they use to commit, er, "abuse"; or they are given some kind of encouragement by military intelligence to "soften up" so-called "suspects" who are to be interrogated later.
Standard procedure would be to have interrogations watched and supervised by JAG officers, but this practice has been deliberately suspended in both Afghanistan and Iraq. (Atrios links to Conason in Salon).
There may have been some thought that no legal implications could ever follow: at least some of the interrogators are private contractors, with no formal or legal status, and no requirement that they comply with the Geneva Convention; and the prisoners are (alleged) combatants, which is somehow different from "prisoners of war." Guantanamo is no place--neither U.S. soil, nor any other kind, so no law applies, and so on. (Lithwick).
U.S. units were ordered to make arrests, based on doubtful evidence. Worse, they would sometimes fail to find a certain person, or realize the address they were given wasn't real, so they would simply arrest someone else, like a neighbour who came over for a look. (Marshall linking to Guardian).
This fits with a description of Baghdad, linked earlier.
I did not quote this story before:
"I was with a US army unit when they went on a raid one morning. Tanks, armored personnel carriers and Humvees squeezed through the neighborhood walls as a CIA operator eyed the rooftops and windows of nearby houses angrily, a silencer on his assault weapon. Intelligence had intercepted a phone conversation in which a man called Ayoub spoke of advancing to the next level to obtain landmines and other weapons. Soldiers broke through Ayoub's door early in the morning, but when the sleepy man did not immediately respond to their orders he was shot with non-lethal ordnance, little pellets exploding like gun shot from the weapon's grenade launcher. The floor of the house was covered with his blood. He was dragged into a room and interrogated forcefully as his family was pushed back against their garden's fence.
"Ayoub's frail mother, covered in a shawl, with traditional tribal tattoos marking her face, pleaded with the immense soldier to spare her son's life, protesting his innocence. She took the soldier's hand and kissed it repeatedly while on her knees. He pushed her to the grass along with Ayoub's four girls and two boys, all small, and his wife. They squatted barefoot, screaming, their eyes wide open in terror, clutching one another as soldiers emerged with bags full of documents, photo albums and two compact discs with Saddam Hussein and his cronies on the cover. These CDs, called The Crimes of Saddam, are common on every Iraqi street and, as their title suggests, they were not made by Saddam supporters. But the soldiers couldn't read Arabic and saw only the picture of Saddam, which was proof enough of guilt. Ayoub was brought out and pushed on to the truck. He gestured to his shrieking family to remain where they were. He was a gentle, avuncular man, small and round, balding and unshaven, with a hooked nose and slightly pockmarked face. It seemed unlikely that he was involved in any anti-American activity; but he did not protest and maintained his dignity, sitting frozen, staring numbly ahead. The soldiers ignored him, occasionally glancing down at their prisoner with sneering disdain. The medic looked at Ayoub's injured hand and chuckled to his friends, 'It ain't my hand.' The truck blasted country music on the way back to the base. Ayoub was thrown in the detainment center. After the operation there were smiles of relief among the soldiers, slaps on the back and thumbs up.
"Several hours later a call was intercepted from another Ayoub. 'Oh shit,' said the unit's intelligence officer, 'it was the wrong Ayoub.' The innocent father of six who had the wrong name was not immediately let go so as not to risk revealing to the other Ayoub that the Americans were searching for him. The night after his arrest a relieved Ayoub could be seen escorted by soldiers to call his family and tell them he was fine, but would not be home for a few days. 'It was not the wrong guy,' said the unit's commander defensively, shifting blame elsewhere. 'We raided the house we were supposed to and arrested the man we were told to.' Meanwhile Army intelligence was still confounded by the meaning of the intercepted conversations until somebody realized it was not a terrorist intent on obtaining weapons. It was a kid playing video games and talking about them with his friend on the phone."
Not speaking the language, convinced that dangerous enemies are hidden here and there in the civilian population, not really knowing how to find them, committing casual brutalities against suspects: that is the pattern.
Matthew Yglesias has said before that the U.S. has two goals. It sincerely wants to bring democracy to Iraq; but it also has goals for its own security which a democratic Iraq might not share. Both plans would have involved removing Saddam, but after that, which takes priority? The Bush administration has never shown that it has thought about how these two goals go together.
From the point of view of U.S. security, they have probably planned from the beginning to build a significant military presence in Iraq, to replace the one they are losing in Saudi Arabia. This in itself, provided the Iraqi people seemed to more or less support such a presence, would be a victory for Western democracy. On the other hand, a real Iraqi democracy might question any substantial U.S. military presence, as the Philippines has come to do since Marcos was overthrown. A new Iraq could be anti-American in some ways, like France, without being undemocratic (or immoral, or haters of Disney movies or freedom). Is the U.S. prepared to say that seeing a country like that develop, knowing that the toppling of Saddam made it possible, is a great victory?
All of this has practical implications on the ground. We are all sick of analogies, but here is another one. The U.S. is occupying Iraq both in the way it occupied Japan proper in the late 40s--working hard to establish a new Constitution, and letting the Japanese themselves take control--and in the way it occupied Okinawa. Okinawa was run almost entirely by the U.S. military until very recently. Japanese civilians were treated as candidates for low-paying jobs in and around the various bases, and that was about it. Some effort to control the discipline of American service men was obviously made, but with a bit of a "boys will be boys" attitude. On the other hand, any disobedience or acting up by the Japanese was taken extremely seriously as a threat to American security.
The Okinawans were not exactly treated as actual or potential masters of their own destiny.
I guess the best reason to think Rumsfeld should be fired is that he has deliberately established and maintained the policy of denying captured "combatants" any formal rights at all.
(See Matthew Yglesias, with lots of links).
At Guantanamo, that includes some U.S. citizens, and people who are finally being released once their innocence is clear. At Abu Ghraib, General Taguba has indicated in his official report that prisoners are much less likely to be guilty of any crime than is the case at Gitmo. Yet the absolute denial of rights has been the same.
(See the scientist who has been held in solitary for a year. (Via Atrios). He was the first senior Iraqi to turn himself in to the Americans. He simply told them he was pretty sure Saddam's WMDs had been destroyed years earlier. Bye, pal. No hearing, no nothing.)
If only because of this policy, it is understandable that prison guards might believe they have official support for torturing prisoners. Of course, we are waiting to find out more about whether officers in military intelligence gave orders, literally or virtually, that this would happen.
In Thucydides, the Athenians offer several defences of their empire. At one point they admit openly that they conquer other cities, without any real pretext, whenever they wish to do so and find it to their advantage. In this they claim they are no different from anyone else. (The Spartans, who appear not to be imperialistic at all, are simply more fearful of risk--and they have a kind of empire over slaves at home). The Athenians go on to say, however, that they are uniquely noble, and even just, among empires in that they grant their disappointed "allies," or subjects, some kind of legal proceeding to air their grievances. In other words, given that they have an empire, which they admit is no more just in itself than any other, the Athenians practice a kind of remarkable and scrupulous justice on secondary or smaller matters.
The U.S. seems to be something like the reverse right now. So confident are they of the justice of their cause as a whole (that it is so different from, even opposed to, imperialism), that they feel justified in running roughshod over the legal niceties.
There is a kind of Spartan thinking in the Americans. They see themselves as slow to use force internationally, and doing so only when provoked. As the other side of the same coin, when they are aroused they feel justified in being very tough, spurning negotiations, rejecting strategic thinking as a sign of weakness, etc. After all they are in the right--so they don't want to give any ground to the evildoers. Not only that, but they've taken a lot of crap over the years (now that they think of it), and it's pay-back time. In the jargon of our age, I guess this might be passive-aggressive behaviour.
Rumsfeld and Ashcroft don't seem to believe in the rule of law for all. They think good people like themselves should enjoy the greatest freedom anyone has ever enjoyed; but bad people can be treated practically like garbage. The procedure for identifying bad people, of course, may itself not be very scrupulous.
UPDATE: An actual example of the Spartan approach to "detainees" who are not (officially) "prisoners of war."
Alcidas, a Spartan admiral, has decided that he wished to "find himself back in Peloponnese [i.e. home] as soon as possible."
"Accordingly he put out from Embatum and proceeded along shore; and touching at the Teian town, Myonnesus, there butchered most of the prisoners that he had taken on his passage. Upon his coming to anchor at Ephesus, envoys came to him from the Samians at Anaia, and told him that he was not going the right way to free Hellas in massacring men who had never raised a hand against him, and who were not enemies of his, but allies of Athens against their will, and that if he did not stop he would turn many more friends into enemies than enemies into friends. Alcidas agreed to this, and let go all the Chians still in his hands and some of the others that he had taken; the inhabitants, instead of flying at the sight of his vessels, rather coming up to them, taking them for Athenian, having no sort of expectation that while the Athenians commanded the sea Peloponnesian ships would venture over to Ionia."
Thucydides Book III, ss. 31-32 (the smaller section numbers are not included here).
Josh Marshall again, linking to Salon(requires registration or watching an ad).
The Marc Zell quote, indicating that at least some neo-cons who believed in Chalabi are now thoroughly disenchanted, is fun in itself. (Quoted by Marshall and by Alterman). This, however, is (I think) the best part:
"The upshot of the piece is that Chalabi's neocon supporters are beginning to realize that he is every bit the huckster and fraud that his most unyielding enemies at State and CIA said he was. He lured them in with all manner of improbable claims about the pain-free peace he'd make with Israel, how he'd upend Arab nationalism and generally make all the intractable conundrums of the region disappear."
"In the popular political imagination we're familiar with the neocons as conniving militarists, masters of intrigue and cabals, graspers for the oil supplies of the world, and all the rest. But here we have them in what I suspect is the truest light: as college kid rubes who head out for a weekend in Vegas, get scammed out of their money by a two-bit hustler on the first night and then get played for fools by a couple hookers who leave them naked and handcuffed to their hotel beds."
I was suggesting that Rumsfeld planted his story with Barbara Lerner, and then the Rumsfeld and Cheney group more collectively won praise from David Frum. In both cases, Chalabi is the misunderstood hero. The new story suggests that the great debate in the Bush administration about Chalabi is not between Defence and State, or neo-cons and nons, but between those neo-cons who still buy the dream, and those who don't.
Of course, it is still possible that Rumsfeld is fundamentally preparing to write his memoirs, blaming "those bastards" whoever they are. He doesn't need any suggestions for a ghost writer or co-author--Frum would be an excellent choice--but I would like to suggest a motto: "Sometimes people who are free do bad things."
There's got to be at least one great book on this. Chalabi lobbies Washington for a decade: invade my country. You'll build something that has never existed before: an Arab state that is pro-Israel and pro-Western! A democracy, even, while we're at it! Why not? Incredibly, a president is elected who seems to buy it all--especially after 9/11.
Of course, it is possible that Bush can say with a clear conscience that he was never talked into anything by neo-cons (it's hard to resist an LBJ or Spiro Agnew phrase, "pointy-headed intellectual" neo-cons). He came to Washington with his own convictions, and his own reasons for wanting to replace Saddam with a democracy. More generally, it is possible that Bush can say with a clear conscience that he has never been thoroughly briefed about anything--or if he has been, he has forgotten.
Still, it looks like Chalabi is the most successful Washington lobbyist in history. He actually got 200,000 U.S. troops carrying out regime change in his country, on the basis of research and planning that can hardly even be called paltry. Basically, research and planning seem to have consisted of "trust Chalabi." The Cuban emigres only dream of having this kind of influence.
What about a wider historical perspective. What exactly was Chalabi's role in Iran-Contra in the 80s? He "suddenly" seems friendly with the mullahs in Iran; yet in Iran-Contra he promised Ollie North and the others that he would take some kind of bold action on behalf of pro-Western, etc. moderates against the mullahs. Was it all lies? Is he always simply going for the best deal at the moment? Yet he has shown himself a prodigy of long-term planning--more so than certain high-ranking government officials we could name.
Very recent posts on Barbara Lerner, David Frum, the neo-cons and Chalabi: here here and here.
Earlier Chalabi posts here and here.
David Frum has added to the argument of Barbara Lerner. Far from trying to defend the U.S. war in Iraq without emphasizing what I have called the wingnut factors, including Chalabi, these pro-war advocates are putting Chalabi and his supporters front and centre.
Frum says two U.S. approaches are at war: roughly those of State and Defence. State says there is no choice but to put a lot of Saddam's people back in power; this is what the Saudis want; it promises the most peaceful transition. Defence wants to put an Iraqi face on the occupation, including a lot more Shiites and Kurds. Somehow this means supporting Chalabi, and "Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress," as the best means to support democratization. De-Baathization as carried out by Chalabi made sense. Presumably the crackdown on Sadr, as apparently suggested by Chalabi, made sense. If Fallujah is still a problem, it simply requires more violence. This is the idealistic, Wilsonian, neo-con approach.
There is no mention here that the U.S. has destroyed a regime which, whatever its faults, was more or less keeping the lid on a mullocracy, and may now be replacing it with...a mullocracy. If Frum is in agreement with Perle, the neo-con position seems to be that elections should not happen too quickly--that might simply put the Grand Ayatollah Sistani in the driver's seat, whether he takes a formal position or not. If elections can remain the goal while being postponed for a while, however, wise people are confident (because Chalabi has assured them?) that Chalabi can emerge as a secular, pro-democracy leader of a Westernized Iraq. In any case, Sistani seems committed to a model that is less of a radical mullocracy than Iran.
The increasing debate about individuals and factions in Iraq always reminds me of how little we have heard about any of this from the Bush administration. Who are the major players, either groups or individuals? Who are, or are likely to be, friends and enemies? If Chalabi is expected to emerge as some kind of hero, why has the President never (so far as I know) mentioned him?
Based strictly on media reports, Chalabi seems a weak reed at best. Many reports suggest he deliberately spread lies, giving the impression of having different sources of information when he did not, in order to reinforce the prejudice in Washington that Saddam had WMDs. He probably promised that liberation would not only be easy, but would be greeted with joy. (Maybe that's why we are now hearing about the "Rumsfeld plan", that was not carried out, to let Chalabi lead 10,000 of his own people into combat. Chalabi? Combat?)
There are indications that Chalabi himself was suprised by the extent of the mullification and radicalization of the Shiite population of Iraq, and of the strength of the Sadr reaction. Once again, it is not so much that there are a lot of strong Sadr supporters, but that there is a lot of anger at the U.S. that is looking for an outlet. If it's true that Chalabi recommended the crackdown on Sadr, it seems that he misread the situation and precipated violence that has proved very difficult to control--including a kind of rough co-ordination of violence by Sadr's Mahdiites in Najaf, and the Baathists or whoever in Fallujah.
One report suggested that Chalabi knew he needed Sistani's support, and he believed Sistani would back the anti-Sadr reaction all the way. Instead, even Sistani seemed surprised by the extent of Sadr's support, and he did not take the Chalabi line. So, if Chalabi is thinking that Sistani will ultimately be a tame ally, this may be mistaken as well.
Then there are the stories that Chalabi makes lots of money, no matter what he does. New stories that he is working for Iran, of all countries. Maybe this was just for money, not politics? Maybe he is a double agent but under it all he really is pro-Coalition and pro-democracy? Frum says indignantly: "indeed this very week another round of anti-Chalabi stories are being spread through Washington." How many rounds of stories have there been, David? What do they amount to?
On oil for food, Josh Marshall says most of the stories Chalabi is circulating are probably true, although it remains suspicious that he is basically sitting on the essential documents. Maybe he simply wants to hide his own role and profits from oil for food? Those of some of his American allies?
Some of what Frum says rings true. Defence is famous for second-guessing diplomatic decisions about every corner of the world and, without knowing many local languages, history, or other stuff that diplomats learn, believing that problems caused by a big bomb can be solved by a bigger one. State is famous for believing in talk talk talk rather than war war war. They probably often have a theory that force won't solve a problem, and might even make things worse. At their worst they will equivocate in a more or less sophisticated way, like Hamlet.
Has Rumsfeld become the voice of Defence, and Powell the voice of State? Frum doesn't criticize Powell by name, but he praises "the approach advocated by the Vice President's Office and the civilian leadership of the Defense Department." Cheney, Feith, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, for starters.
So maybe I was unfair in suggesting that Rumsfeld is floating these stories to friendly journalists in order to cover his departure from the scene, and begin his memoirs; maybe he is trying to force a change of direction in Iraq. Kevin Drum has been saying for a while(see here and here) that President Bush is simply not the true believer in an Iraq mission that some of his supporters are. Rather than pay a high and increasing price, he would probably be prepared to declare victory and bug out of Iraq, more or less as he did in Afghanistan.
Bob Kagan in the Washington Post offers something for both the neo-cons and the President's critics. He criticizes (via Kevin Drum) the President for his lack of leadership, but he also suggests (via The Corner)there is no real choice, now, but to push on for democracy.
Kevin Drum: "In a war like the one we're in, the tactics of conquest are the only ones that will work, but conquest itself is both unacceptable to us and conterproductive to our long-term goal of engaging moderate Muslims--a goal accepted by both liberals and conservatives alike as key to long term victory."
What tactics of conquest is he talking about? "...in a war of liberation, you are expected to liberate. You are emphatically not expected to raze entire cities at the cost of thousands of civilian lives."
In a way Drum fudges on whether massive destruction will work or not. He says matter-of-factly that it is the only thing that will work, then argues that it will be counter-productive in the "long term."
We probably all need to think about this, regardless of what happens in Iraq in the next few weeks or months. Let's assume for a moment that the pro-war crowd are right about a couple of things. Not only is Islam itself spreading, but radical forms of Islam, linked to arbitrary government and terrorism. In 1900 there were perhaps one or two mullocracies: "Turkey," or the Ottoman Empire, which was constantly referred to as a sick man, etc.; and maybe Egypt.
By 2000 there were many mullocracies, and they were a growing threat to the West. (I should have added Jordan to this list). One big catalyst to "Arab unity" was the mujahadeen war in Afghanistan in the 80s; it seems that virtually no one in the West gave any thought to what the aftermath would be of arming and (loosely) uniting these somewhat disparate forces, especially if they actually defeated the Number 2 power in the Cold War. The West is an easy target for resentment and hatred because it is both infidel and wealthy. The U.S., at least, is almost unbelievably powerful in conventional military and technological terms. Therefore radical Muslims will target the U.S. and the West as a whole (when they are not blowing up Saudis and what not).
What do we do about this? This I think is Glenn Reynolds' question, and that of a lot of pro-war folks. If not Bush's approach, which seems like a dog's breakfast at this point, then what exactly? This is a question not only for Kerry, but for many of us, including, if I may say so, Jimmie Chirac and me. (I guess I'm thinking of The Shining: "If ... I may be so bold sir").
For the sake of our security, it seems that we need to win hearts and minds. Drum joins those who say: we can't use force except in small efforts (let me guess: "surgical strikes"?); diplomacy and old-fashioned police work, along with spending some of the $100 billion (or more) going in to Iraq on foreign aid, etc.
But what if this actually doesn't work?
And by the way, is it true that the massive destruction thing doesn't work? It worked in both Japan and Germany in World War II and the aftermath. The survivors, who had lost many loved ones and been creamed by aerial bombardment including, of course, atomic bombs, had in fact given up all loyalty to the militaristic regimes that had started the war. They were ready for liberal democracy. (Machiavelli might say they were stupefied, and hence ready for anything).
Maybe the difference today is that no one Arab/Moslem country can be decisive? There is a whole huge world out there, or different worlds, Arab overlapping with Moslem overlapping with Third World Asian? If so, Drum and others may be right; massive destruction in one spot will only infuriate folks in a lot of other spots.
Last Sunday I drove into Toronto. On the radio all the talk was that Brian Mulroney had delivered a major speech, and given the strongest possible endorsement to the new Conservative Party and leader Stephen Harper. Harper was even quoted saying the Conservatives are united--not like the Liberals, who have been divided for so long between the Paul Martin and Jean Chretien factions.
Later that day Joe Clark delivered his bombshell: he's not thrilled about either Martin or Harper, but Martin might be a less bad Prime Minister. This is Clark's strongest statement yet that he will not support the new party, at least as long as it is led by Harper.
This reminds me of my never-ending article on Dalton Camp, and of the question: whither the Red Tories? One article in the Globe and Mail mentions a few high-profile ex-Tories who are supporting the Liberals, but it is not complete.
Listed here:
David Small, long-time Progressive Conservative organizer, especially for Clark now committed to working for a Liberal candidate in the upcoming election. He is out gay, and he makes it clear the new party's stance on the rights of gays is a big issue with him.
Senators Lowell Murray and Norman Atkins
Gary Carr, a former Tory speaker of the Ontario Legislature, has decided to seek a federal seat for the Liberals. (It is sloppy of the Globe not to mention that Carr got into a big fight with his fellow provincial Tories in the last few year or two).
Libby Burnham, a long-time Toronto Tory (An old joke about Canada's national media: "Turning now to the views of ordinary people, we'll go to the streets of Toronto--or to one of the nicer clubs, whichever we come to first").
Dennis Anderson, a former PC cabinet minister from Edmonton. (A former provincial minister, surely? Under Lougheed?)
Red Tories who are "sticking around":
Alberta's Scott Thorkelson
Peter MacKay, the former PC leader
Bill Davis, former Premier of Ontario, was one of the godfathers of the new party--along with Ralph Klein
As far as I know, Mike Harris and many of his former Cabinet and Caucus colleagues are working for the new party in some capacity. I don't know of any except Carr who are sitting out, much less crossing over.
The main point the article makes is that if even a small proportion of former PCs vote Liberal--say 10%, this would mean not all the "combined" Alliance and PC vote from last time will go to the new party; another Liberal majority may be the result. Harper needs to at least hang on to all that "combined" vote, especially in Ontario, and add to it.
Chantal Hebert writes in the Toronto Star that Clark seems to be opposing policies as Independent MP that he supported, or at least did not criticize, as party leader. Once again, however, the gay rights issue emerges in her account: Clark voted for the Svend Robinson bill to protect gays against discrimination; Peter Harper did not. Nearly one-third of Liberal MPs have said they will not support this bill when it comes to a vote in the Commons after the election.
Keith Martin, an MD and former Alliance and then (briefly) Conservative MP, is now a Liberal. To his credit, he has been consistent in advocating two-tier medicare, and getting trouble for doing so, in both or all of his parties.
Scott Brison, a former PC who ran for the leadership of that party, has crossed the floor and become a Parliamentary Secretary.
The sole remaining PC MP from Quebec has also crossed to the Liberals. I can't find details quickly.
John Ibbitson has written in the Globe that the true home for Red Tories now is the NDP.
Certainly by the end of his life, that's where Dalton Camp seemed to belong. He was even spouting quasi-Marxist economics like Naomi Klein: increasing concentration of capital in fewer hands, permanent underclass, etc. Presumably he always thought government programs could provide real and lasting help--a proposition Marx regarded as sentimental nonsense (the more the workers suffer, the sooner they'll demand the needed changes)--but Camp at least flirted with economic determinism, as do those NDPers who are normally not allowed to speak on TV.
We have learned from the biography of Camp that he had a group of supporters who actually wanted him to become Prime Minister. A bit embarrassingly, one would think, they each carried one card from a deck with them--a spade--and Camp carried the ace. (What if one more follower had joined? A joker?) There were no women, even though Flora MacDonald may have been Camp's most loyal supporter. Lowell Murray was one. So was William Saunderson, who turned out to be a dud as a minister under Mike Harris; and Roy McMurtry, who for some years has been a judge in Ontario.
From Slate:
"But the Economist notes that, though some American congressmen are calling it 'the biggest scandal ever,' there's 'little hard evidence' implicating anyone in wrongdoing. While seven different entities are carrying out investigations, so far most of the evidence comes from Iraqi government documents that haven't been authenticated."
Could Ahmed Chalabi be peddling another pack of lies to the Bush Administration and the public?
Until today I was quite willing to believe that the UN cannot be counted on to take on any major responsibility--especially in a violent and disorderly place like Iraq. Now that Prime Minister Martin has said something similar, I have my doubts.
UPDATE: Josh Marshall links to this UPI story, and raises the question whether we are all being asked, once again, to trust Ahmed Chalabi.
This article is missing one piece of information that is in the one linked above: not only is Chalabi chair of the committee that has been investigating; he owns the newspaper that has been running the most sensational details, with very little indication as to what the evidence is.
The UPI article does mention that no one knows exactly what documents the Chalabi committee has, or whether they are truly willing to hand all documents over to the new, Paul Volcker-led group (spokespeople imply they will do so only if there is full mutual sharing of information). Reputable people seem to be convinced there is a long way to go in establishing the relevant facts; yet sensational details have been spread around the world.
UPDATE: Marshall again: hard to believe that Chalabi has been working consistently for the Iranian governmet as well as himself and (presumably) the Coalition and ... whoever else he's working for. And yet: Iran? Perhaps that government will soon be the government of the Shiite part of Iraq as well? Just joking. Marshall not only comments on a new Newsweek article, he gives the low down on some episodes from a few years ago.
Barbara Lerner, in National Review Online (via Kevin Drum), says there was a bold, streamlined, effective plan that would have worked--the Rumsfeld/Chalabi plan. Unfortunately, it was not carried out.
"Rumsfeld's plan was to train and equip--and then transport to Iraq--some 10,000 Shia and Sunni freedom fighters led by Shia exile leader Ahmed Chalabi and his cohorts in the INC, the multi-ethnic anti-Saddam coalition he created. There, they would have joined with thousands of experienced Kurdish freedom fighters, ably led, politically and militarily, by Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani."
Since we have just been talking about a new Woodward book, it seems natural to ask: who is the source? And the answer seems to depend on: who looks good in this story? Clearly: Rumsfeld. Only he had the bold, Chalabi-centric plan that would have worked. (After all, Chalabi has proven himself to be reliable, time and time again).
What's puzzling here is: who does Lerner think has been in charge of the Iraq operation, countermanding the bold and brave Don Rumsfeld, and making one stupid mistake after another? Who fired Jay Garner, another hero of Lerner's, and replaced him with Paul Bremer? Who would it be who outranks Rumsfeld, and could show such a pattern (as Lerner presents it) of stupidity and ignoring the obvious?
What is even more striking is that if Rumsfeld is giving this story to a friendly source now, he is acting like the ship is sinking, and he has no intention of being on board when it goes down. Something similar emerges from the picture of Colin Powell in (what I am reading about) Woodward's book; and in Condi Rice's comments to the effect that "we would have had to be crazy to have planned to invade Iraq in the period right after 9/11."
Colin Powell has consistently given the impression that he is not a hot head like so many in the administration, he believes in diplomacy and multilateralism, he gave his bizarre performance at the UN to keep his job, etc. This apparently emerges in Woodward's book. Who does Lerner portray as having the wrong view of everything, and prevailing? "Paul Bremer, a State Department man"; "our State Department Arabists"; "Bremer and his backers at State and the CIA." Without naming him, is Lerner saying that Powell has been calling the shots, or acting as a mouthpiece for the State Department? Is that what Rumsfeld is going to say in his memoirs?
The slightly chilling part of Lerner's account is at the end:
"It is not yet too late for us to recognize these facts and act on them by dismissing Brahimi, putting Secretary Rumsfeld and our Iraqi friends fully in charge at last, and unleashing our Marines to make an example of Fallujah. And when al Jazeera screams "massacre," instead of cringing and apologizing, we need to stand tall and proud and tell the world: Lynch mobs like the one that slaughtered four Americans will not be tolerated. Order will restored, and Iraqis who side with us will be protected and rewarded."
"Make an example of Fallujah"--a city of about 500,000 people; and tough it out when those who hate us scream "massacre."
In the New Yorker for May 3, Jon Lee Anderson quotes a Shiite cleric named Ayad Jamaluddin. A quick introduction:
Jamaluddin is an Iraqi who fled Iraq after Saddam sentenced him to death. He lived for some time in Iran, then for many years in Dubai, where his family still lives. Recent events:
"Late in 2002, Jamaluddin was approached by American officials who were gathering together pro-Western Shia who could be counted on to help stabilize Iraq after the upcoming war. He was one of several Shia who were flown into the country by the Coalition just before Baghdad fell."
Jamaluddin was apparently present when Abdel Majid al-Khoei was murdered--probably by Sadr's loyalists. Jamaluddin used to favour an Iran-style mullocracy, as Sadr apparently still does. Now he thinks even Sistani's approach is too mullah-centric, or not sufficiently secular. We might say he is a Rumsfeldian--he has not yet been trusted to serve on the Governing Council.
Some of his thoughts after Anderson says Japan was rebuilt only after massive and terrible destruction:
"...maybe what we need is another Hiroshima for Iraq. Maybe Fallujah will be our Hiroshima."
So the thought is at least out there. If one extreme plan would be to simply cut and run, another would be to cause massive destruction to a major city by air, in hopes that doing so would destroy any hope of the enemy rising, and make the people as a whole so desperate, they will welcome their American saviours.
More or less on this note: Mickey Kaus thinks that simply blockading Fallujah has done a lot of good--supplies and activists needed for attacks have been coming from there, and the supply has been reduced. (Wednesday, April 28.)
Kaus also seems to think it is unlikely that anyone in the Bush administration was lying as they went to war--as opposed to deluding themselves, or acting very foolishly in some other way. ("Not Orwellian Enough.")
First an overview. Ahmed has been paid an estimated $2 million for securing a contract for the ERINYS company to provide security for oil field facilities in Iraq. Workers are paid less than those employed by the higher-profile security forces (who are usually ex-Coalition military), even though the oil field work is dangerous.
"In another controversial move, ERINYS has brought thousands of highly paid mercenaries into Iraq -- many former members of the secret police of South Africa's now-defunct apartheid regime. These white South African trainers are typically paid $5,000 a month -- or about 45 times more than their Iraqi counterparts."
Ahmed, a member of the Iraqi Governing Council, and his nephew Salem have both been heavily involved in drafting an interim constitution.
Ahmed has been outspoken in saying the U.S. should not use force against Sadr in the holy city of Najaf. There is speculation that Ahmed earlier had actually advised the U.S. to move against Sadr--which provoked the recent uprising. The suggestion is that Chalabi was confident that he had Sistani's support to become President (or Prime Minister--whichever is more powerful?) in the new Iraq, and Sadr was a marginal but potentially dangerous player. Unfortunately, the U.S. attack seems to have made Sadr less marginal.
Salem, a lawyer, has been named Director General of the tribunal that will try Saddam Hussein.
Paul Bremer has announced that Baathists will now be incorporated into the military, security forces and professions including teaching. He says this was always part of the plan, and is not an about-face. Remarkably, Ahmed is openly critical of this move; it is clear he was one of the major proponents of de-Baathification last year.
Now it seems official that Ahmed and other U.S.-appointed members of the IGC will be jettisoned as the UN builds a Council with more popular support in Iraq. Ahmed's organization may even lose more than $300,000 per month in funding that it has been receiving. (Ahmed has received an estimate $40 million from the U.S. Congress over the past decade).
Now it gets--I guess the word is Byzantine. Many of the allegations about corruption surrounding the UN oil-for-food program that ran during the Saddam years have come from a committee chaired by Ahmed. The allegations received a high profile when they were published in a newspaper owned by Ahmed. The allegations make the UN look bad, and Ahmed is on record as not wanting the UN to get involved in Iraq. Bremer, confirming that he no longer trusts Ahmed, is insisting on further investigations of these allegations being done by a third party.
Josh Marshall has given more background on Salem's activities, including the fact that while Salem has been securing lucrative contracts in Iraq, he has a powerful friend in Washington; Salem's business partner is a former law partner of a person who actually has some of the responsibility for dispersing these contracts: Doug Feith.
All of this provides some background to a long post by Juan Cole (check all the good recent posts)--but still makes it a bit surprising. Richard Perle showed up somewhat unexpectedly to testify in Congress--and argued that power should be given to "the Iraqis," but there should be no hurry about elections. This seems to mean: give power to Ahmed Chalabi.
So the Chalabis, who may have been put where they are, and made very rich, by the neo-cons, are still trusted by at least some of the neo-cons--despite everything.
See Josh Marshall again for more.
Juan Cole has also added more today, including more detail on the Salem Chalabi--Doug Feith connection, and a link to a source that explains that Germany was subjected to de-Nazification that was far less severe than the de-Baathification that Iraq has gone through--directed, apparently, by Ahmed Chalabi.
"Liberation" would be a funny name for stripping away many layers of government, security, and civil authority (including school teachers) in Iraq, leaving it worse off than Germany was left after its military defeat in 1945.
UPDATE: part of the Ahmed story in the NYT, April 27.
UPDATE: More in another NYT article, this time on the Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group created by Douglas J. Feith:
"At the end of 2001, Mr. Maloof and Mr. Wurmser briefed top Pentagon officials as well as John R. Bolton, the under secretary of state for arms control and international security and a veteran of the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Maloof also met with Mr. Perle at his suburban Washington home. As chairman of the Defense Policy Board, an advisory group, he had security clearance.
"That session was interrupted by a call from Ahmad Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress, an exile group. At Mr. Maloof's request, Mr. Perle asked Mr. Chalabi, now a member of the interim government of Iraq, to have his staff provide Mr. Maloof information gleaned from defectors and others. The request was unusual, because Mr. Feith's analysts were supposed to review intelligence, not collect it. And Mr. Chalabi at that time had a lucrative contract to provide information on Iraq exclusively to the State Department, which would send it along to the intelligence agencies.
"Mr. Maloof later met with member of the Iraqi National Congress's staff. As it turned out, Mr. Chalabi was a risky source: some of the information his group provided was incorrect or fabricated, intelligence officials now believe."
Some very intelligent people put themselves at the mercy of Ahmed Chalabi, on the grounds that he had information that the CIA was somehow hiding from the President.
UPDATE: It seems the U.S. is now re-Baathifizing--not just for school teachers, police, or government officials--but for high-ranking generals, one of whom reported directly to "Chemical Ali."
Quite a change. (Washington Post via Kevin Drum).
Something that puzzles me. John Kerry is still taking some criticism because in 1971, when he had returned from combat and become a leader in the anti-war movement, he testified in Congress that U.S. military personnel in Vietnam had committed "atrocities." The idea is that as long as the country is at war, talk like that is contrary to "supporting the troops"--I guess, whether it is true or not.
(Kerry says he probably went too far, even in using the word "atrocity"; he says he never referred to killing babies; yet he says "all I did was to tell the truth about some of the things that happened over there," "All I know is that it happened as a matter of course, and there were things that were happening over there as a matter of policy.")
In this case, however, we have recently heard from the coverage surrounding the experiences of sound-alike Bob Kerrey that indeed atrocities had become common, maybe even a standing policy of the U.S. military. If a hamlet was found to harbour enemies, and had somehow been given fair warning, it would be destroyed--and everyone found there could be killed.
One implication would be that the famous My Lai massacre, for which individuals were tried and convicted, was not an isolated action carried out by renegades, but an example of policy in action.
Why would Americans ever act this way when they were trying to win hearts and minds? Because on the one hand they had great difficulty in telling friends from enemies; and on the other hand, they were confident that it should be easy to get rid of a relative minority of trouble-makers, and win over everybody else.
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