U.S. Plans in Iraq 

U.S. Plans in Iraq

Barbara Lerner, in National Review Online (via Kevin Drum), says there was a bold, streamlined, effective plan that would have worked--the Rumsfeld/Chalabi plan. Unfortunately, it was not carried out.

"Rumsfeld's plan was to train and equip--and then transport to Iraq--some 10,000 Shia and Sunni freedom fighters led by Shia exile leader Ahmed Chalabi and his cohorts in the INC, the multi-ethnic anti-Saddam coalition he created. There, they would have joined with thousands of experienced Kurdish freedom fighters, ably led, politically and militarily, by Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani."

Since we have just been talking about a new Woodward book, it seems natural to ask: who is the source? And the answer seems to depend on: who looks good in this story? Clearly: Rumsfeld. Only he had the bold, Chalabi-centric plan that would have worked. (After all, Chalabi has proven himself to be reliable, time and time again).

What's puzzling here is: who does Lerner think has been in charge of the Iraq operation, countermanding the bold and brave Don Rumsfeld, and making one stupid mistake after another? Who fired Jay Garner, another hero of Lerner's, and replaced him with Paul Bremer? Who would it be who outranks Rumsfeld, and could show such a pattern (as Lerner presents it) of stupidity and ignoring the obvious?

What is even more striking is that if Rumsfeld is giving this story to a friendly source now, he is acting like the ship is sinking, and he has no intention of being on board when it goes down. Something similar emerges from the picture of Colin Powell in (what I am reading about) Woodward's book; and in Condi Rice's comments to the effect that "we would have had to be crazy to have planned to invade Iraq in the period right after 9/11."

Colin Powell has consistently given the impression that he is not a hot head like so many in the administration, he believes in diplomacy and multilateralism, he gave his bizarre performance at the UN to keep his job, etc. This apparently emerges in Woodward's book. Who does Lerner portray as having the wrong view of everything, and prevailing? "Paul Bremer, a State Department man"; "our State Department Arabists"; "Bremer and his backers at State and the CIA." Without naming him, is Lerner saying that Powell has been calling the shots, or acting as a mouthpiece for the State Department? Is that what Rumsfeld is going to say in his memoirs?

The slightly chilling part of Lerner's account is at the end:

"It is not yet too late for us to recognize these facts and act on them by dismissing Brahimi, putting Secretary Rumsfeld and our Iraqi friends fully in charge at last, and unleashing our Marines to make an example of Fallujah. And when al Jazeera screams "massacre," instead of cringing and apologizing, we need to stand tall and proud and tell the world: Lynch mobs like the one that slaughtered four Americans will not be tolerated. Order will restored, and Iraqis who side with us will be protected and rewarded."

"Make an example of Fallujah"--a city of about 500,000 people; and tough it out when those who hate us scream "massacre."

In the New Yorker for May 3, Jon Lee Anderson quotes a Shiite cleric named Ayad Jamaluddin. A quick introduction:
Jamaluddin is an Iraqi who fled Iraq after Saddam sentenced him to death. He lived for some time in Iran, then for many years in Dubai, where his family still lives. Recent events:

"Late in 2002, Jamaluddin was approached by American officials who were gathering together pro-Western Shia who could be counted on to help stabilize Iraq after the upcoming war. He was one of several Shia who were flown into the country by the Coalition just before Baghdad fell."

Jamaluddin was apparently present when Abdel Majid al-Khoei was murdered--probably by Sadr's loyalists. Jamaluddin used to favour an Iran-style mullocracy, as Sadr apparently still does. Now he thinks even Sistani's approach is too mullah-centric, or not sufficiently secular. We might say he is a Rumsfeldian--he has not yet been trusted to serve on the Governing Council.

Some of his thoughts after Anderson says Japan was rebuilt only after massive and terrible destruction:

"...maybe what we need is another Hiroshima for Iraq. Maybe Fallujah will be our Hiroshima."

So the thought is at least out there. If one extreme plan would be to simply cut and run, another would be to cause massive destruction to a major city by air, in hopes that doing so would destroy any hope of the enemy rising, and make the people as a whole so desperate, they will welcome their American saviours.

More or less on this note: Mickey Kaus thinks that simply blockading Fallujah has done a lot of good--supplies and activists needed for attacks have been coming from there, and the supply has been reduced. (Wednesday, April 28.)

Kaus also seems to think it is unlikely that anyone in the Bush administration was lying as they went to war--as opposed to deluding themselves, or acting very foolishly in some other way. ("Not Orwellian Enough.")

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