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Nice piece by Mark Krikorian on The Corner. The gist: Chalabi (assuming he turns out to be a complete crook or worse) is not a unique case; there has been an unfortunate tendency for Americans to find a hero in some exotic country. Krikorian mentions Savimbi of Angola--truly an amazing story about a guy who was once feted at the Reagan White House, and later was armed by the CIA.
Once it was clear that Savimbi would reject any election that did not give him absolute power, he became a pariah, and indeed he was hunted down as an outlaw by erstwhile allies from his own country. The BBC: "Most of the obituaries have been predictably damning. Some of the harshest criticism has come from those who once knew and admired Savimbi, but have since admitted they were duped by his charisma into overlooking serious character flaws. A former backer in Washington once conceded ruefully: 'Savimbi is probably the most brilliant man I've ever met, but he's also dangerous, even psychotic'."
A wikipedia piece mentions that the Heritage Foundation, in particular, went ga ga over Savimbi.
Perhaps a more noteworthy case, with results that are still with us, is that of the mujahadeen, the Northern Alliance, or simply the warlords in Afghanistan. During the Cold War, just as with Savimbi, all that seemed to matter was that they were fighting the Soviet Union. Krikorian:
"During the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, conservatives could be seen aping the Mujaheddin by wearing Afghan Chitrali hats on campus and some even made their way to Central Asia, as though it were Spain in the 1930s for the Left." (Yes, he and I spell the word differently. I'll have to dig out that old piece on T.E. Lawrence and the transliterating of Arabic words, one of these days).
Individuals who at best are tyrants or would-be tyrants (in an old-fashioned sense of that word--non-totalitarian, perhaps not all that violent) and at worst, something much worse, are turned into heros. One can only speculate that a suppressed desire to be an outlaw, free of the laws, a slightly cruel cavalier, a true cowboy, finds an outlet in making these characters into romantic figures.
Chalabi was presumably too much a man of soft hands and beautiful suits to play the traditional role perfectly, yet he played freedom-fighting patriot for the neo-cons in a way that convinced them.
Krikorian goes further and points to the problem of making some foreign leaders into devils, while others are made into heros. Objectively, leaders who have been seen as black and white often turn out to be very similar; it is as if Americans would prefer to see foreign policy as a morality play.
More details unfold on Iraq-Chalabi-Iran. See Laura Rozen. The most impressive new elements are:
- those erstwhile Chalabi defenders who have been allowed to see the new evidence against him are rushing to distance themselves from him. They have long known about relationships between Chalabi and his supporters, on the one hand, and the Iranians on the other--but the new evidence is truly new and very serious.
- building on Josh Marshall's observation that Aras Karim, "Chalabi's now fugitive intelligence chief who has headed the Pentagon-funded Information Collection Program," has long been suspected of working for Iran, senior Bush officials have put a dangerous amount of trust in these people for a long time.
"How did this happen? Who signed off on Karim at the Office of the Secretary of Defense? How was he let in in the weeks after September 11 into the inner sanctum of the secretive US intelligence operation being assembled in the Pentagon? Is that not out and out treason?"
(See also newer Josh Marshall here and here).
It actually makes sense that Chalabi has been working for the mullahs in Iran from the beginning, and the Bushies put more or less complete trust in Chalabi until very recently. The apparent lack of any U.S. strategy or planning, the implausibility of the official rationales for war, are a stark contrast to the fact that everything that has happened in Iraq has benefitted Iran. Saddam is gone, the pro-Iran mullahs in the Shiite south have become major players, and if anything like democracy comes about in Iraq the mullocratic Shiites will probably dominate the Sunnis.
By contrast, the U.S. seems to have been surprised by everything that has happened. It may still turn out that some of their wishes will come true, but they are not likely to get a high proportion of what they wanted, and the little that they get will have been unplanned and unanticipated. They were surprised that Chalabi on his own was so unpopular--had such a small following. They were surprised at the strength of the Sistani movement--indications that a group of mullahs would be major players in any new government in the Shiite south. They were surprised at the Sadr movement, and even more by the way the mullahs, while making clear some disagreements with Sadr, were respectful and even deferential to him insofar as he was trying to get the Americans out of the country. They were surprised by Fallujah, and the extent to which Baathists, insurgents, and foreigners--whoever they are--were willing to join in the Sadr uprising.
As Kevin Drum's timeline shows, Americans have been consistently surprised and disappointed at Chalabi's behaviour--even before the recent evidence (still secret) that he handed over top secret information about U.S. operations in Iraq to the Iranian mullahs. Almost from the day he set foot in Iraq, he was not particularly pro-U.S., pro-Israel, and pro-Western, but pro-mullah and pro-Iran.
Some might argue that Chalabi's willingness to antagonize his American sponsors shows his innocence or integrity. It might simply show that once Saddam was overthrown, the Americans had fulfilled their role in Iran's plans. Chalabi's intelligence chief, Aras Karim, is apparently now in Tehran.
Recently Bush has responded to every specific question about the future of Iraq by saying "we'll leave that to Brahimi" (the UN advisor). In effect, until about January of this year they kept saying, in response to similar questions, "we'll leave that to Chalabi." Why did they believe so fiercely, or pretend to, in the WMD stories? They trusted Chalabi more than they trusted the CIA.
(I still think it's possible they didn't expect any of their forces to come under attack by WMDs, either because these weapons couldn't be deployed quickly, or because they didn't exist at all. This would fit the "Chalabi tells us everything will be smooth sailing" explanation of events. In this case, lies about WMDs were for the media and the public, not for decision-makers.)
Rumsfeld was surprised by the scale of the insurrection last fall. There were suddenly more Iraqis willing to stand and fight U.S. troops than there had been in March and April of 2003. It is because of this development, we have been told, that Rumsfeld agreed to extend some of the interrogation methods of the anti-Al Qaeda campaign to Iraqis--some of whom were innocent of any wrong-doing. The U.S. might have gotten away with torturing people who knew something about Al Qaeda--or might have known something--for a long time. For a liberator to torture Iraqis, willy-nilly, is something else again.
This was probably the time when they began to suspect that everything Chalabi had told them was a lie--except when he chose to give up Baathists and other Iraqis that he wanted to give up for reasons of his own. After months in-country, they were totally in the dark--yet they had paid Chalabi a fortune for intelligence.
Underneath all the b.s., the U.S. presumably had some minimal goals they wanted to achieve in Iraq. A new permanent military base, showing the entire Mid East and Gulf regions that the U.S. meant business, and could take action as needed. Some kind of decent, stable, constitutional Iraqi government, which would not interfere with the U.S. military installation (the Okinawa model). Finally, as Matthew Yglesias has said, they were probably sincere in wanting democracy, but not if it interfered with the first two.
They probably believed they could install Chalabi, with his alleged popularity, as interim President for quite some time--years. When elections were eventually held, they would somehow go the way Chalabi and the U.S. wanted--a secular government, not objecting to a huge U.S. military installation, pro-Israel, etc.
The U.S. has suffered higher casualties than they hoped or intended. They have no clear exit strategy. It seems unlikely they will have much to say about the make-up of an Iraqi government that both enjoys popular support and lasts for a while. And it seems unlikely that a sovereign Iraq, no matter how it is governed, will accept any kind of permanent U.S. military presence.
Iran will have gotten perhaps 90% or more of what it wanted. The U.S.: a much lower percentage.
If all of this is true, it may also not be the first time the Iranian mullahs have gotten the better of the U.S. As I have said, I hope someone looks again at Iran-Contra in the 80s, in which some of the same neo-cons were very much involved.
UPDATE: Peter Galbraith says the Kurds would be happy to have a U.S. military base in Kurdistan. (My guess is this is due partly to their fear of the Turks). So that is one strategic goal that is still in sight for the U.S. Questions remain: did Saddam's Iraq threaten any U.S. citizens, anywhere in the world, at the beginning of March 2003? Are any U.S. citizens safer because of the U.S. invasion of Iraq?
Among many points Galbraith makes about how this war has actually hurt the national security of the U.S., is this one: "The United States does not now have the military or diplomatic resources to deal with far more serious threats to our national security....At the beginning of 2003 Iraq posed no ... danger [of disseminating nuclear weapons technology]. As a result of the Iraq war the United States has neither the resources nor the international support to cope effectively with the very serious nuclear threats that come from North Korea, Iran, and, most dangerous of all, our newly designated 'major non-NATO ally,' Pakistan."
By comparison, Iran has achieved some significant objectives for their national security, at minimal cost (the U.S. bearing the costs).
It's cool to see both Kos and Matthe Yglesias commenting on Canadian politics.
Kos is correct: the NDP used to be reliably strong enough to win a few seats, and get a definite hearing in the media. "Social democracy" was more respectable in Canada than in the U.S.--where it is almost confined to faculty clubs at universities.
This has changed a bit recently. The federal Liberals have carried out an aggressive budget austerity plan, followed (once the budget was balanced) by tax cuts. What has become the standard right-wing agenda. Yet they still portray themselves as defenders of the most sacred programs, especially Medicare or national health insurance. Anyone who would spend more or tax more than them is supposedly fiscally reckless; anyone who would spend less or tax less is heartless. Under Chretien they almost squeezed the NDP out of existence; Red Tories in the old Progressive Conservative party didn't count for much outside of Atlantic Canada; the separatist Bloc Quebecois had a strong hold on Quebec; and the party that was most like the Republicans in the U.S., Reform which became Alliance, was confined to the West.
Now there is a new Conservative party, trying to present a true responsible right-wing alternative to the Liberals. The NDP have a strong leader in Jack Layton. The Liberals may have a tough time in both Quebec and the West because of the sponsorship scandal. Ontario, as usual, is crucial.
Yglesias is also correct in saying that while the Liberals may have a tough time forming a majority, they are still likely to form the government with a minority or plurality of seats. If the Conservatives were to somehow win a minority, they would have a more difficult time than the Liberals in finding someone to combine with to win confidence votes.
One wrinkle is that the Ontario Liberal government has just increased income taxes. They call the new tax a health premium and say it will go for health care costs, but it is going to be administered simply as an addition to provincial income tax, going in to general revenue. The provincial Liberals campaigned on a promise of no new taxes, and they admit they are breaking that promise.
This action by a provincial Liberal government, just before a federal election, may hurt the federal Liberals. One extreme Machiavellian view would be that Premier McGuinty of Ontario would not mind if Liberal Prime Minister Paul Martin were defeated. McGuinty's friend John Manley ran for the federal leadership and lost to Martin. Worse, it soon became clear he would not get a position of any importance from the new prime minister. McGuinty may also think Martin has been too slow in keeping promises to help Ontario and Toronto financially. If Martin loses, there will surely be another federal leadership race, and McGuinty's friend Manley has another chance.
Pure speculation. See here.
UPDATE May 27: Thanks to my political friend in Ottawa, from the Ottawa Citizen:
PUBLICATION: The Ottawa Citizen
DATE: 2004.05.27
EDITION: Final
SECTION: News
PAGE: A1 / Front
BYLINE: Lee Greenberg, With files from Bruce Garvey and AnneDawson
SOURCE: The Ottawa Citizen
DATELINE: TORONTO
NOTE: Federal Election 2004.
Liberals plunge to 33% in Ontario: Fallout from Ontario budget still hurting
Martin: survey
TORONTO - Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty's budget continues to damage
federal Liberal hopes in the province, according to a poll obtained by the
Citizen that shows only 33 per cent of Ontario voters will support a Liberal
candidate in the coming election.
The Decima/Navigator survey provides the first glimpse of voter intentions
in the province since the federal election call on Sunday. Last Wednesday's
budget introduced a health premium that could cost individuals as much as
$900 a year.
The budget also raised cigarette and alcohol taxes.
Both federal and provincial Liberal support is at historic lows according
the poll, which began tracking data in April 2000.
Ontarians' support for Paul Martin's Liberals has dropped from 56 per cent
in January to 33 per cent -- a 23-point slide in just four months. Since
April, support has fallen seven points, according to the poll.
Conservatives are up to 26-per-cent support, a six-point rise over the same
period. The NDP has risen seven points and now enjoys 20-per-cent voter
support.
The drop in support is partly attributed to last Wednesday's budget, in
which Mr. McGuinty broke a highly publicized campaign promise to hold the
line on taxes.
"Part of the problem is definitely the provincial budget, but it is only
part of the problem," pollsters write in an e-mail explaining the results.
"Just 28 per cent say the federal Liberals deserve to be re-elected while a
whopping 57 per cent say it is time for a change."
An Ipsos-Reid poll conducted between May 18 (the day of the Liberal budget)
and May 20, had Liberal support at 42 per cent, compared to Conservatives at
28 per cent and the NDP at five per cent.
Meanwhile, a day after downplaying Prime Minister Paul Martin's $9-billion
medicare package as a "campaign promise" made in the heat of battle, Mr.
McGuinty abruptly changed course yesterday and declared himself "very, very"
open to the plan.
"I have every confidence that the prime minister is making the right
decision with respect to the financing of his health care plan," Mr.
McGuinty said at a Kitchener school, where he continued to tout investments
in education and health in a post-budget blitz.
However, Mr. Martin shot back at Mr. McGuinty yesterday, saying he would not
have reneged on a promise of no tax hikes and furthermore declined to say
whether he would be seen in public with the Ontario premier during the
federal election campaign.
Mr. Martin was on the defensive yesterday over his prescription to save
medicare after several premiers, health care professionals and opposition
leaders harshly criticized his plan and in Mr. McGuinty's case, brushed it
off as just "a promise made in the thick of a campaign."
On Tuesday, Mr. McGuinty said he would not be rushed into an endorsement of
Mr. Martin's medicare package as a matter of political expediency. But in
doing so, he unintentionally drew attention to the fact that it was an
election promise.
As for Mr. McGuinty joining him on the campaign trail, Mr. Martin ducked:
"I'm not going to play that game."
Pollsters suggest the federal race mimics last October's Ontario election,
in which the governing Tories lost power after eight years in office.
"The opposition party is running a 'time for a change' campaign while the
governing party is attempting to rebrand itself with a relatively popular
new leader," the e-mail says. "Can Paul Martin escape Ernie Eves's fate? Can
Stephen Harper repeat Dalton McGuinty's success?"
The survey of 600 Ontarians was conducted between May 19 to 23 and is
considered accurate within four percentage points. The data is contained in
Ontario this Month, a syndicated monthly study for private clients.
Ontario Finance Minister Greg Sorbara told the Citizen editorial board that
he didn't expect widespread criticism of the health premium to rebound on to
the federal Liberal campaign in the province and hurt Mr. Martin's electoral
chances. He said he expected voters "to understand why the provincial
Liberal government needed to raise revenues."
In Ontario, the provincial Tories and Liberals are locked in a virtual dead
heat. Mr. McGuinty's Liberals have 32-per-cent voter support compared to the
Conservative party's 29 per cent.
For the Liberals, that means a 20-point drop in popularity in just five
months.
The NDP, which received a huge boost when it won a recent byelection in
Hamilton East, is the main beneficiary of the Liberal slide. They are up to
21 per cent, according to the survey.
Lee Smith has a piece on Syria and "Assad the younger." (Link via Instapundit). The point seems to be that the Bush administration is right to distrust Assad, and Seymour Hersh was wrong to suggest that trusting him would be a better policy.
My question again is: is Assad worse than Musharraf of Pakistan?
Part of Smith's piece makes no sense. General Mustafa Tlass recently retired. He was famous for hating both Israelis, and indeed Jews in general, and Arafat of the PLO. With him gone, Arafat's Fatah has been invited to open an office in Damascus for the first time in years. Maybe the general's retirement paved the way? Maybe the general was pushed to retire? Smith doesn't claim to answer many questions, but he suggests briefly that the U.S. may have pushed for the general's retirement because of the general's involvement in smuggling weapons into Iraq. Is it a big success for the U.S. to have a new office of Fatah in Syria?
Liddell Hart says the British general Montgomery, in World War II, was at his best reacting on the spur of the moment to a changing situation, when events bore little or no relation to what was planned. Yet Montgomery would never admit that this had happened. Asked how he had succeeded, he would always say "we stuck exactly to the plan." Presumably he wanted to encourage careful classroom instruction, and the study of precedents, to young officers; or he may have been embarrassed that his success came from a kind of instinct or genius, difficult to describe or teach.
Presumably, if things go at all well in Iraq, Bush will claim success not only for the Iraqi people, but for his personal vision and planning.
I'm finally getting through Peter Galbraith's article, "How to Get Out of Iraq," famous for the recommendation that Iraq should be divided into three or more countries. One thing that strikes me is the number of different plans there have already been. Here is a no doubt incomplete list.
1. Jay Garner. American advisers as de facto ministers; ministries would be staffed by Iraqis who would come to work as usual. Garner to turn power over quickly to a provisional Iraqi government. Minimal de-Baathification.
2. Within three weeks, after massive looting of buildings and institutions where white-collar professionals tended to go to work: Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) replace Garner. Iraqi participation to be limited to an advisory council, U.S. to stay in Iraq for up to three years. U.S. to write a democractic constitution, then turn power over to an elected government. Maximal de-Baathification (apparently recommended by Chalabi, who we now learn may have been carrying out the wishes of the mullahs in Iran).
UPDATE: Newsweek says Bush officials continue to deny that the actual idea of Baathification came from Chalabi. It was a U.S. decision, they say. However there is no doubt that Chalabi was immediately put in charge, and there is evidence that he ran the program very corruptly to help friends and hurt enemies. He would apparently resort to extortion, for example--demanding payment so that some individuals would not be black-listed from working for the new government.
3. A few more weeks: Bremer announces he will share power with a representative Iraqi governing council (IGC).
4. November 2003 (eight months after invasion) Bremer summoned to Washington, announces new strategy. On June 30, 2004, power to be turned over to a sovereign Iraqi governmnet chosen by a system of caucuses held in each governate or province of Iraq. "By January this plan was put aside (it was widely described as 'election by people selected by people selected by Bremer')."
5. While telling Iraqis it wanted to defer constitutional issues to an elected Iraqi body, the CPA drafted an interim constitution--transparently written by US government lawyers (likely, if one reads the document, liberal Democrats). "All deliberations on the law were done in secret and probably fewer than one hundred Iraqis saw a copy of the constitution before it was promulgated. To write a major law in any democracy--much less a constitution--without public discussion should be unthinkable." Bush administration "praised itself generously" for the signing of this document in early April; by late April it was falling apart.
Shiites, as (likely) majority of the country, object to giving veto to a small number of small provinces--designed to allow either Kurds or Sunni Arabs to block a new constitution. Shiite religious parties "insist that Islam must be the principal source of law throughout Iraq." "Both Shiites and Sunni Arabs object to downgrading Arabic to one of two official languages. Sunni Arab nationalists and Shiite religious leaders object to Kurdistan retaining even a fraction of the autonomy it has today."
6. Officially, the U.S. is still proceeding on the most recent strategy--the fifth by Galbraith's count--"based on the interim constitution and a takeover of sovereignty on June 30 by an as yet undetermined body." But this strategy is falling apart, so in effect there is some sixth strategy at work that no one has explained. Among other things, de-Baathification has been abruptly reversed. (Maybe it was better for Iran than for either Iraq or the U.S.). It seems a commonplace to say that noone other than the U.S. will have any kind of sovereignty over Iraq as a whole after June 30. (There are obviously questions as to whether the U.S. has sovereignty over Fallujah, Najaf or other cities--even Baghdad outside the Green Zone). The U.S. and UN are trying to set up yet another representative council, this time more representative or less tainted as U.S. puppets; but that council will not be able to mount effective troops anywhere, and will certainly not have command over U.S. troops.
If this proves true, it will be the most amazing revelation about Gulf War II:
"Was the real back story to Gulf War II not that a group of neoconservatives tried to realize their grand strategy for the Middle East, but that a bunch of academics playing spy games got duped by Iranian intelligence?" (Laura Rozen via Kevin Drum).
Let's spell it out a bit further. The neo-cons and others had put implicit trust in Chalabi for many years. (The whole Iran-Contra fiasco, also referred to by Rozen, needs to be re-examined now.) Post-9/11, they had a tremendous enthusiasm to do something about terror, and a dissatisfaction with simply getting rid of the Taliban and tracking down Al Qaeda members one by one. (Something they have apparently done with some success, although of course they let too many people go during the main fighting in Afghanistan).
They wanted something bigger, more noble sounding. The President didn't want to "swat flies," like Clinton. They wanted an approach totally different from Clinton's, and they were ready with their papers and slide decks. An allegedly Wilsonian approach, winning the hearts and minds of distinct "nationalities" or peoples by means of democracy and idealism; always linked to Plan B, an allegedly Jacksonian approach of acting first and thinking later, if at all.
If the stories now emerging are true: Chalabi, acting for the Iranians, played them like musical instruments.
Iran's goal may have been to install a pro-Iran (pro-mullah) government in at least the southern part of Iraq. They seem well on the way to doing that. The Kurds, more or less by luck, may end up basically with an independent Kurdistan. The Sunnis, Baghdad, and roughly the middle of Iraq, are perhaps the least known factors right now.
A decent, stable regime may still emerge in Iraq--or different regimes in three or more regions. But the situation is likely to be very different from anything planned or promised by the U.S. If the main U.S. goal, underneath all the fantastic spinning, was to install a substantial military base in Iraq, that is increasingly less likely to be achieved. Any kind of sovereign Iraq is likely to demand the withdrawal of all U.S. forces.
So among many possibilities still in play (including, of course, a long and violent civil war), one is that Iran gets what it always wanted, the U.S. does not get what it (most) wanted.
I've just discovered Ann Althouse's blog (thanks to Instapundit). She discusses Con Law cases, which will help me in preparing my class. She has a nice, matter-of-fact way of commenting on various aspects of her life; and she writes better than I do.
One of her themes is television. She has been discussing both the Sopranos and American Idol. I am looking forward to seeing more Sopranos (it comes to Canada on free or broadcast TV after a delay of a year or two), but I refuse to watch any of the Idol stuff, or for that matter any so-called Reality TV.
She has mentioned that she hasn't watched sit coms for many years. I'm close to that point myself, even though I think of myself as someone who can really enjoy a good sit com. People tell me that given my sense of humour, I should like the Simpsons or South Park, but I've never really gotten into them. Seinfeld and Frasier also leave me a bit cold. I recognize the craftsmanship in both writing and acting, and there are certainly some funny scenes, but I'm not likely to curl up for an entire episode.
Seinfeld has been discussed endlessly: family and tradition are either a joke or a burden: "all you've got is your friends." This was apparently given a slight twist by, yes, Friends, another show I would not watch. Let's see: everyone's kind of in Beckett's world of loneliness and meaninglessness, but everyone is young and beautiful; they live in much nicer apartments than they can afford, yet they don't have to do disgusting things for rich old men; and they sleep around without ever getting, you know, jealous or anything. Seinfeld was at least a bit more realistic in that everything is harder: finding an apartment, getting laid, finding someone you can really enjoy, say, watching TV with.
I was a big fan of Cheers, and some will say: wasn't that the same, "all you've got is your friends" kind of thing? Frasier gives yet another funny twist: a father and two sons. On many days they wish to God they could find someone else to socialize with/live with, but they keep coming back, grumbling, to the threesome. (This suddenly reminds me of the harsh, difficult but hilarious novels of Ivy Compton-Burnett. Female authors who are hidden treasures/under-appreciated? Bring them on). Having said that modern people are rootless, Allan Bloom considers the apparent exception of the French, especially those who never leave Paris except for a brief vacances. Bloom says: they're not rooted, they're just stuck.
Before going on I should repeat the wise observation of a friend of mine: what makes comedies funny is that people don't reform or get better. Likewise they either have no genuine concern to help others, or they over-do it for selfish reasons, like the Boy Scout in P.G. Wodehouse who is always doing dangerous, appalling good deeds. (W?)
I liked Becker, at least in earlier days. (Here they go again, giving a misanthrope who really likes one-night (or one hour) stands a steady girlfriend. Everyone has to get steadily nicer on TV). A customer in the diner announces he's suicidal. Each main character summarizes his/her life in a couple of sentences, after which he says "Gee, I'm not such a loser after all." In another episode, the Valium slowly wears off as Becker sits in a plane; claustrophia and rage take over our hero, a family physician. There were a couple of very good Christmas episodes; Christmas itself, every single aspect of it, threw Becker into a rage. There was a high-school graduation speech that was very funny. Rhea Perlman did a guest spot as a therapist who is supposed to help Becker with his anger. As she talks to him, she is won over to his approach: "Yeah! Why the hell should I take so much crap?"
Cheers: I think the "Diane" era was better than the "Rebecca" era. Diane was obviously portrayed as a loser, but she showed tremendous spunk (the old Mary Tyler Moore word), and she would actually persuade the others to hint that they might have a better nature, if not actually display it. (Diane to Norm: "You can't guide your entire life by the views of a bunch of beer-drinking swine." Norm: "It's worked for me so far.")
With Rebecca the writers just seemed to take satisfaction in hurting her because in some ways she was very successful. She has risen higher than Diane, so she must be brought lower? Is there some idea that career plus family might barely if ludicrously work for a man, but it can't work at all for a woman? I don't know. But I think one thing I don't like in Frasier is the treatment of Ros. The spunk is still there. But it is almost unbelievable that they could get away with portraying such a skanky and downtrodden woman, looking for Mr. Right, yet constantly throwing herself at losers.
Let's stay with this theme. The Sue-Ann Niven character on MTM. Does this too show that women can't have it all, or even half of it? Somehow she was one of the strongest characters on the show. There isn't actually all that much frustration in her life. It doesn't seem she really wants to settle down--she may get almost, but not quite, exactly what she wants from men. Of course, no one knows better than her, "The Happy Homemaker," what regimented nonsense the domestic scene can be.
I loved the "old" Newhart--the psychologist in Chicago. My favourite episodes of Cheers probably all involved Frasier and Lilith. Maybe the best of all was the dinner party: starving Sam inhaling food, Diane fussing, and Frasier and Lilith going through weird alternations of love and anger.
Today: I think the Bonnie Hunt show has its moments--mainly when they are doing the "show within a show." It actually feels spontaneous at times. The only shows I will watch right through are the Law and Order franchises. My favourite is "Criminal Intent." There are obviously only so many episodes they can get out of this concept of the detective who is a brilliant showman, perhaps about as crazy as some of the criminals, but I love it. They have already come back to the Australian psycho bitch, and they probably will again. CSI, before I stopped watching it, kept bringing Grissom back to a bordello specializing in S&M. Ah yes, Grissom would say, it's the submissive who's in charge.
Doesn't that belong in a sit com?
I should have linked to this earlier: Colby Cosh is correct about campaign finance legislation. The Canadian government has actually gone much further than the new law in the U.S. to restrict spending by anyone other than the political parties--you know, the good guys. Until the case reached the Supreme Court, every court had struck the law down. Now, unfortunately, the Supreme Court has upheld it.
The dissenters argued that it might be legitimate to set an upper limit on spending, but the limit should be high.
On a more cheerful note: the Supreme Court has defended the right of a biotech company to market engineered crops, and control the distribution of their product. This is the next great hope for feeding the world.
CBS reported yesterday that the most serious charge against Chalabi, in the eyes of U.S. officials, is that both he and one of his own senior officials was spying for Iran. Today Newsday is reporting that Chalabi's intelligence operation, which was receiving over $300,000 per month from the U.S., was actually a pro-Iranian front. (Both via Josh Marshall). Pro-Bush sources seem to be confirming that this is the word from the White House. (See also here. Until he actually showed up in Iraq, some Bushies kind of hoped he was another DeGaulle. Er, no.). Of course, it's still barely possible that they're trying to give him some anti-U.S. cover so he has some chance of taking part in any future government in Iraq. It seems more likely, however, that they've believed a lot of lies from him over the years, and now they've (more or less--see Oil for Food) stopped believing.
Records show that he was paid $30 million by the State Department from 2000 to 2003 (Marshall again). This is far more than three or four hundred K per month, and it must be in addition to the $40 million or so the U.S. Congress paid him over a 10-year period. Then there are the security contracts in Iraq in the past year, the jobs and contracts for relatives, and so on. Let's just keep it at $70 million for now, in very round numbers.
UPDATE: Newsday says it has been $40 million total over four years: including $33 million from the State Department and $6 million from the Defense Intelligence Agency. But the Iraqi National Congress started receiving funding earlier, under the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, and indeed even earlier than that. See more here.
Couldn't they have picked up a Washington hooker for less than that? ("All I want you to do is whisper in my ear: 'You are the real Greatest Generation; you are huge and powerful; strategy ... liberation ... democracy.'")
Of course, depending on who her friends were, she might have been tougher on them than Chalabi has been.
There has been some attempt by the White House to say they're not sure who Chalabi is, he was never more than a minor player, at most he's one of many people who were graciously granted meetings with senior staff, etc. Obviously there are so many Iraqi individuals who have received $70 million from official sources, sat near the First Lady at the SOTU, and had their personal militias flown in to Iraq by the Pentagon with the invasion, that it's difficult to tell them all apart.
If they were like LBJ, they would start mangling his name on purpose: "Charlappi? Was that the name? I believe that was a Mexican gentleman we had some contact with. Yes, as I recall, the President chatted with him once at a social function."
One more, and I know this is very stale: With all the commotion, and the evidence that a supposedly brilliant plan has turned into guano, it's just possible that Dick Cheney will have another heart attack. The worse news: Bush would have to take over as President.
UPDATE on the cost of Chalabi to the U.S.:
While we're at it: a piece in the New Yorker on Chalabi (via Atrios): A new total! "Between 1992 and the raid on Chalabi's home, the U.S. government funnelled more than a hundred million dollars to the Iraqi National Congress. The current Bush Administration gave Chalabi's group at least thirty-nine million dollars." Making Saddam look as bad as possible was originally a CIA operation, with money channelled through the Rendon Group.
Some Americans seem to be saying: We always knew Chalabi was a thief, but a liar? That's just too hard to bear.
Updates: The stipend of over $300,000 per month to Ahmed Chalabi's organization was cut off (effective June 30) a few days ago. Today U.S. forces raided Chalabi's home and office, and arrest warrants were issued for some of his associates. Chalabi has denounced the U.S. more strongly than ever, claiming he speaks for an authentic Iraqi government, and the U.S. should leave Iraq.
From Kevin Drum and Juan Cole: In addition to the dispute about records in the Oil for Food "scandal" (for which we have mostly Chalabi's word so far), there are rumours that Chalabi and his, er, associates are accused of stealing from the Iraqi people--both during a major currency exchange, and in preparing government assets for the changeover on July 1. Charges seem to include things like extortion and kidnapping, which may be laid at the feet of the "militia" that the Pentagon flew in to Iraq in order to help Chalabi.
The CIA and the State Department gave up on Chalabi long ago because of the evidence that he was stealing much of the money Congress was giving him for political activities.
Is it time once again for Chalabi to slip into the trunk of a car and make a run for the border (the means by which he escaped criminal prosecution in Jordan)? A friend at work says Chalabi may be tarred and feathered and driven from the country; I made a similar suggestion a few weeks ago.
Where to next for our adventurer? Maybe Iran? No doubt there are some rich, powerful suckers in Tehran.
And yet: now there is speculation that some erstwhile "Bush and the war" supporters, increasingly disappointed at how the war is going, will pick Chalabi over Bush. (Certainly Glenn Reynolds, for example, seems to want to believe everything Chalabi says about Oil for Food, despite having been burned on WMDs). But of course, they may not be rich or powerful enough to make any difference.
Is Chalabi always just chasing a (preferably U.S.) dollar, while knowing just what to say to his patrons? Is he some kind of Iraqi patriot? Did he give his heart to the Iranian mullahs, or to Sistani or some of the more radical Shiite groups in southern Iraq, long ago? I don't know. We should find out more in the coming months.
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