U.S. Plans in Iraq
Liddell Hart says the British general Montgomery, in World War II, was at his best reacting on the spur of the moment to a changing situation, when events bore little or no relation to what was planned. Yet Montgomery would never admit that this had happened. Asked how he had succeeded, he would always say "we stuck exactly to the plan." Presumably he wanted to encourage careful classroom instruction, and the study of precedents, to young officers; or he may have been embarrassed that his success came from a kind of instinct or genius, difficult to describe or teach.
Presumably, if things go at all well in Iraq, Bush will claim success not only for the Iraqi people, but for his personal vision and planning.
I'm finally getting through Peter Galbraith's article, "How to Get Out of Iraq," famous for the recommendation that Iraq should be divided into three or more countries. One thing that strikes me is the number of different plans there have already been. Here is a no doubt incomplete list.
1. Jay Garner. American advisers as de facto ministers; ministries would be staffed by Iraqis who would come to work as usual. Garner to turn power over quickly to a provisional Iraqi government. Minimal de-Baathification.
2. Within three weeks, after massive looting of buildings and institutions where white-collar professionals tended to go to work: Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) replace Garner. Iraqi participation to be limited to an advisory council, U.S. to stay in Iraq for up to three years. U.S. to write a democractic constitution, then turn power over to an elected government. Maximal de-Baathification (apparently recommended by Chalabi, who we now learn may have been carrying out the wishes of the mullahs in Iran).
UPDATE: Newsweek says Bush officials continue to deny that the actual idea of Baathification came from Chalabi. It was a U.S. decision, they say. However there is no doubt that Chalabi was immediately put in charge, and there is evidence that he ran the program very corruptly to help friends and hurt enemies. He would apparently resort to extortion, for example--demanding payment so that some individuals would not be black-listed from working for the new government.
3. A few more weeks: Bremer announces he will share power with a representative Iraqi governing council (IGC).
4. November 2003 (eight months after invasion) Bremer summoned to Washington, announces new strategy. On June 30, 2004, power to be turned over to a sovereign Iraqi governmnet chosen by a system of caucuses held in each governate or province of Iraq. "By January this plan was put aside (it was widely described as 'election by people selected by people selected by Bremer')."
5. While telling Iraqis it wanted to defer constitutional issues to an elected Iraqi body, the CPA drafted an interim constitution--transparently written by US government lawyers (likely, if one reads the document, liberal Democrats). "All deliberations on the law were done in secret and probably fewer than one hundred Iraqis saw a copy of the constitution before it was promulgated. To write a major law in any democracy--much less a constitution--without public discussion should be unthinkable." Bush administration "praised itself generously" for the signing of this document in early April; by late April it was falling apart.
Shiites, as (likely) majority of the country, object to giving veto to a small number of small provinces--designed to allow either Kurds or Sunni Arabs to block a new constitution. Shiite religious parties "insist that Islam must be the principal source of law throughout Iraq." "Both Shiites and Sunni Arabs object to downgrading Arabic to one of two official languages. Sunni Arab nationalists and Shiite religious leaders object to Kurdistan retaining even a fraction of the autonomy it has today."
6. Officially, the U.S. is still proceeding on the most recent strategy--the fifth by Galbraith's count--"based on the interim constitution and a takeover of sovereignty on June 30 by an as yet undetermined body." But this strategy is falling apart, so in effect there is some sixth strategy at work that no one has explained. Among other things, de-Baathification has been abruptly reversed. (Maybe it was better for Iran than for either Iraq or the U.S.). It seems a commonplace to say that noone other than the U.S. will have any kind of sovereignty over Iraq as a whole after June 30. (There are obviously questions as to whether the U.S. has sovereignty over Fallujah, Najaf or other cities--even Baghdad outside the Green Zone). The U.S. and UN are trying to set up yet another representative council, this time more representative or less tainted as U.S. puppets; but that council will not be able to mount effective troops anywhere, and will certainly not have command over U.S. troops.
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