lloydtown 

Last Words

Would it make headlines if the Pope's last words were: "Bush is wrong about Iraq--and capital punishment"?

Was Rehnquist Deep Throat?

I'm not an aficionado of theories about Watergate, but this one intrigues me.

John Dean is reporting a rumour that the person who was Deep Throat, leaking information to Woodward and Bernstein, is ill; if he (or she?) dies, the whole story will finally come out. (via Kevin Drum)

So some are wondering: Was William Rehnquist Deep Throat?

He doesn't seem to fit in that he wasn't in "the executive branch" during the year before the 1972 election. As a commenter on Kevin Drum's blog says, he "wasn't in the loop." But he would have known some of the secrets of the Nixon White House.

Rehnquist practised law in Phoenix from 1953 to 1969. In 1964 he was legal advisor to Barry Goldwater's presidential campaign--which no doubt allowed him to make many contacts with "true blue" conservatives.

After Nixon was elected in 1968, Rehnquist "served as Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal Counsel from 1969 to 1971. In this role, he served as the chief lawyer to Attorney General John Mitchell." (Unless stated otherwise, facts and quotes from Wikipedia). Mitchell was at the centre of the fund-raising part of what was revealed by Watergate, and Mitchell was known to say these dubious activities went on for four years, not just the year before the 1972 election. Testifying before the special Senate committee, "John Mitchell, the former attorney general, campaign manager, and Nixon law partner, acknowledged the 'White House horrors' of the previous four years and added that he would have done nearly anything to ensure Nixon's re-election." (Stanley Kutler on Slate).

Nixon didn't really know Rehnquist. "President Nixon mistakenly referred to him as 'Renchburg' in several of the tapes of Oval Office conversations revealed during the Watergate investigations. Nixon nominated Rehnquist to replace John Marshall Harlan II on the Supreme Court upon Harlan's retirement, and after being confirmed by the Senate by a 68-26 vote on December 10, 1971, Rehnquist took his seat as an Associate Justice on January 7, 1972."

How did Rehnquist get elevated this way with no experience on the bench, and very little experience with constitutional issues? One of Dean's books is called [link=http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0743226070/blogeasy-20]The Rehnquist Choice[/link]. Dean emphasizes that Nixon had tried two or three nominations of Southern crackers, each more embarassing than the one before, all rejected by the Senate. Finally Rehnquist's name came up--Dean takes some credit for this, as he had worked with Rehnquist for a while at Justice. The time from first mentions of Rehnquist to nomination was incredibly short. Nixon was presumably happy to have a "true conservative" who could be confirmed fairly easily. It's even possible that Rehnquist not only lobbied among his conservative friends, but put the appropriate bug in Dean's ear.

UPDATE Feb. 12: I've mixed things up a bit here. Thanks to David Greenberg.

[blockquote]After these two hardball plays [Republicans blocking Abe Fortas for Chief Justice, then (with a memo drafted by Rehnquist) forcing Fortas to resign over financial dealings)], Democrats struck back. Although they didn't contest Nixon's first nomination, that of Warren Burger as chief justice, they blocked his first two choices for the Fortas seat: Clement Haynsworth, ostensibly on the basis of his own ethical shortcomings and segregationist background, and G. Harrold Carswell, who was considered a glaring mediocrity with a segregationist record much worse than Haynsworth's. Irate, Nixon backed off his vow to appoint a Southerner and selected Minnesota's Harry Blackmun, a boyhood friend of Burger's, who sailed to confirmation.[/blockquote]

[blockquote]... when Nixon suddenly found himself in September 1971 with two more openings---his third and fourth---he had a narrow needle's eye to thread. [snip] We learn, for instance, that Rehnquist was not Nixon's first choice for the job but his seventh or perhaps eighth, depending on how seriously you take Nixon's consideration of Senator Robert Byrd (whom Nixon liked because he seemed likely to win approval from fellow Senate Democrats yet also to vote with the Court's conservatives on racial issues). Rehnquist was chosen at the last minute, after others had crashed and burned. One of his most ardent promoters was John Dean.[/blockquote]

Would any of this make Rehnquist want to bring Nixon down? Maybe the lawlessness appalled him, and he wanted to see the system work by putting Nixon through an impeachment, and possibly removal from office?

So: not in the executive branch during the months when Watergate unfolded, but a former member of the Executive Branch who had worked closely with Mitchell. Not a Nixon loyalist--more a conservative true believer like Buchanan, whose name has also been mentioned. The scenes in a parking garage are unlikely, and I don't know about the detail of smoking cigarettes.

UPDATE: Aha! "Chief Justice Rehnquist has been a lifelong smoker." Pat Buchanan has been known to point out that he quit smoking some years before Watergate, and therefore he can't be Deep Throat.

UPDATE Feb. 8: Here's Barry Sussman, who was the Washington Post's editor in charge of the Watergate coverage:

Deep Throat's contributions were infrequent. As I wrote in The Great Coverup, "Woodward could never count on seeing him, and they seldom met at all. Generally, Deep Throat confined his help to telling Woodward whether information we had was correct or explaining what seemed to be the philosophy behind the Watergate spying without getting into the individuals responsible for it."


Deep Throat may have known a lot but he didn't give much away. As a mole he was pretty feeble; I can't recall any story we got because of him. True, he offered encouragement that Watergate was important at a time when hardly any other news organizations were going after the story. That was nice, but we knew it on our own.


Deep Throat also could be decidedly unhelpful. In December, 1972, he diverted us from a perfectly good story, one saying John Mitchell was ruined politically because of Watergate. Looking back, nothing could have been more obvious. But as we were preparing the article, Deep Throat criticized it, according to Woodward, saying its premise was wrong.


It may be that Deep Throat wanted to shield Mitchell. That wouldn't be surprising, as over time a number of people, including a chief prosecutor at Mitchell's Watergate trial, expressed admiration for the former attorney general. John Dean spoke of Mitchell as a father-figure.


I have always thought Deep Throat was someone in the Justice Department who may have had warm feelings for Mitchell. Possibly there was a sense of "kinship," a desire to "draw a line" at some point in the Post's coverage.


Loyal to Mitchell, but not to Nixon? Not really knowing a lot of detail from inside the White House? I believe this fits.

UPDATE: With every Woodward book, I think you have to ask the question: which individual in the activities which are portrayed as more or less sleazy comes through relatively well? This is probably the one who spilled his or her guts on "deep background." On [link=http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0671241109/blogeasy-20]The Brethren[/link] (1979) (review on Amazon):

... the account is surprisingly balanced: anyone expecting a "liberal" flogging of an increasingly conservative court will be surprised, on the one hand, by the authors' depictions of the increasingly unfit and ornery Douglas and the unsophisticated yet affable Marshall and, on the other hand, by their open admiration of Rehnquist, who comes across as (by far) the most likeable and amiable of the justices.


By this time Woodward and Rehnquist may have grown quite close.

IQ and the Death Penalty

Ann Althouse is concerned that a court is now hearing the argument that if a convicted person's IQ is found to be above a certain level, even if they were earlier found to be retarded to the point where they had a right not to be executed, the planned execution can proceed once again.

This is one of these unbelievable appeals in the U.S. that goes on forever. Atkins v. Virginia was decided in June 2002. The crime for which Atkins was convicted took place in August 1996. A jury sentenced him to death twice, and this sentence was affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court in the year 2000. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled 6 to 3, in an opinion written by Stevens, that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and is thus precluded, for those who are "mildly retarded"--a phrase which was given a somewhat precise meaning. Everyone seems to agree that the "severely or profoundly mentally retarded"--whose condition is clear immediately--have been exempt from the death penalty at least since the time of the drafting of the U.S. Constitution.

It is the same Mr. Atkins who is now found to have a higher IQ than when he was tested before. The prosecution wants to proceed with an execution as planned earlier.

Althouse:

The prosecutor in the Atkins case is declaring that there is a bright line at 70 and the judge seems to agree ("The issues are bright lights and targeted with a bull's-eye"). That means a random guess on a single question on the test could be a matter of life and death!


According to the text of the Atkins decision, avoiding the death penalty requires more than just a low IQ score:


[blockquote][C]linical definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18. [/blockquote]


But what about someone who has the evidence of "significant limitations in adaptive skills" from childhood but lacks a low enough IQ score? And how low does the score have to be? The Supreme Court mentions several numbers, but doesn't draw a bright line. How could it? Americans don't put that much trust in IQ tests. How could our conception of what is "cruel and unusual punishment" be thought to depend on these tests, which we do not rely on in any other area of social policy?


True, faith in IQ scores is probably a good example of American naivete--like faith in the polygraph machine. Perhaps even SAT/ACT, etc. On the other hand, the main reason the IQ test has been scrapped from public schools probably has to do with the way it makes certain races look bad. Be that as it may, there are two views here. One is that except for the profoundly retarded, whose condition is not in doubt, mental retardation in itself cannot exempt someone from the death penalty. The other is that there is a reliable way of drawing some different line, at "mild" retardation, and sparing even more people from execution.

As one of my students said in a paper, this is a good strategy for opponents of capital punishment: attack the marginal cases that might generate a lot of public sympathy. But this is one case where I think Scalia succeeds in taking the majority's arguments apart. (Although I gave a good grade to a student who took the majority's side).

Mental retardation can already be used as a mitigating factor in sentencing by either a judge or a jury. This does not require precise definitions, or a belief that the retarded are not responsible for their actions. It might be simply that of two criminals working together, the one who is retarded is easily led. On the other hand, the majority is arguing that the retarded cannot be blamed for executing a crime--as if they are somehow more likely than others to do so; and that the death penalty is not a deterrent for those who do not fully rationalize their decisions.

[blockquote]One need only read the definitions of mental retardation adopted by the American Association of Mental Retardation and the American Psychiatric Association (set forth in the Court?s opinion, ante, at 2?3, n. 3) to realize that the symptoms of this condition can readily be feigned. And whereas the capital defendant who feigns insanity risks commitment to a mental institution until he can be cured (and then tried and executed) [snip] the capital defendant who feigns mental retardation risks nothing at all.[/blockquote]

There is not a clear enough basis here to decide who the mildly or moderately retarded are, and grant them a blanket exemption from the death penalty. Rather than precisely describing a part of the population, and prescribing how they should be treated, the Court is probably inviting a parade of fakers to try a new basis for appeals.

Mentally retarded offenders "face a special risk of wrongful execution" because they are less able "to make a persuasive showing of mitigation," "to give meaningful assistance to their counsel," and to be effective witnesses. Ante, at 16. "Special risk" is pretty flabby language (even flabbier than "less likely")--and I suppose a similar "special risk" could be said to exist for just plain stupid people, inarticulate people, even ugly people. If this unsupported claim has any substance to it (which I doubt) it might support a due process claim in all criminal prosecutions of the mentally retarded; but it is hard to see how it has anything to do with an Eighth Amendment claim that execution of the mentally retarded is cruel and unusual. We have never before held it to be cruel and unusual punishment to impose a sentence in violation of some other constitutional imperative.


This is great stuff. Even if the claim about risk is true, it could apply to lots of people who suffer from no known medical or developmental condition; and it is irrelevant to the death penalty argument proper.

The death penalty makes sense or it doesn't. It is consistent with the eighth amendment, or it isn't. Atkins doesn't help in answering these questions. Althouse has said that like a lot of Americans, she wants capital punishment to be on the books, but she wants it to be used very seldom. Maybe this is the Stevens-O'Connor "pragmatic" approach.

UPDATE Feb. 11: The California Supreme Court has ruled unanimously (opinion by Janice Rogers Brown, about whom we may be hearing more) that IQ alone cannot decide whether someone is executed. Ann Althouse comments again.

Gay Marriage

The Government of Canada seems determined to push through legislation to legalize same-sex marriage throughout the country. It is now allowed for in Ontario because of a court decision. It has been a bit of tough issue for Paul Martin's Cabinet and Caucus, but in the House of Commons he will have plenty of support from the left-wing parties, so there will be no threat to his majority.

Colby Cosh is all over one aspect of the issue: once we approve of same-sex marriage, will we have any basis to reject polygamy? I guess feminism will go along way to stop the spread of polygamy; stereotypically, at least, it is worse for women than monogamous marriage. Colby seems worried that polygamy is very ancient, and is still practised within certain cultures. They may demand the right to continue this tradition on grounds of freedom of religion.

Colby refers to "culture," speaks of a choice between "European Christianity [and] other ways of life," and between the New Testament and the Old. He specifically mentions Arabs and Nigerians. I don't know: are we going to be challenged with thriving polygamous communities, some of which seem successful? Will we fall back on the "consenting adults" test? Is there any more harm, to children or anyone else, in polygamy than in gay marriage?

In his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, Antonin Scalia worries about incest and bestiality, among other practices. If adults must be free to pursue their own sexuality, why not these items on the menu? The majority doesn't even suggest an answer. Perhaps non-human animals (in the old days, beasts) can't consent. Incest? I'm kind of bracing myself for an argument that children can consent to sex, especially with someone who is known to be somehow careful or considerate about them. Incest might be looked upon more favourably than sex with strangers. That would open things up.

Western Europe and the U.S.: Different Asians?

I like this piece by Niall Ferguson in the Jan/Feb Atlantic (Registration required).

Not only is Western Europe becoming more secular, while the U.S. remains evangelical, and is perhaps increasingly so; but the Asian immigrants to Western Europe are largely Moslems--especially Arabs in France, Turks in Germany. Europeans can say there are a number of reasons to stay out of a Middle East war: prudent caution about near-term prospects; the need to maintain long-term relationships with the regimes now in place there; and fear of terrorists.

The U.S. receives lots of Asian immigrants, but mostly not Moslems/Arabs/Turks. Significant numbers of Chinese, and people from the Indian sub-continent--the very people who are probably gaining at home as well as in the New World. Is Europe becoming a backwater in more ways than one?

Disraeli and Other, er, Tories

This piece by David Gelernter in the Weekly Standard is very ingenious. In order to show that W is part of a tradition from Disraeli to Randolph Churchill to Winston to Reagan/Thatcher, always opposed to sneering intellectuals who are ashamed of their own ancestors and want to defer to German professors, he probably distorts things a touch. But it is beautifully done.

Gelernter emphasizes Disraeli's novels, which I have never read. I have had the vague idea for a while that if you focus on the novels, and think Disraeli always somehow had it in mind to apply the teaching of these novels to politics, his career takes on a different cast. Leaving out the novels, he seems to be pretty much an opportunist, blowing with the wind. When he became the hero of the "die hard" Tories, opposing Peel over free trade, this was a surprise to a lot of people, including perhaps himself. It's not clear he ever opposed free trade at all. Certainly within a few months of leading the rebellion against it, he was telling everyone he didn't oppose it any longer.

Perhaps in his heart he always wanted to be one of the old, landed Tories. Certainly he had a real affection for them--even when they exasperated him by refusing to come to London because they were busy hunting or pursuing some other pastime on their estates. At one point he compromised, and persuaded them to have a kind of caucus retreat at one of these country properties. There were still no meetings, however; his colleagues were all up early to hunt; Disraeli slept in, and didn't hunt. This is the way Aristotle predicts the gentry will act, even when they are relatively active in politics. Their disdain for the whole business can even be a good thing insofar as it keeps them out of any crusades, for lack of a better word. Still, Disraeli's novels suggest that the gentry had to be a key part of any "national" party, and the left-wing intellectuals were terribly wrong to try to reform these people out of existence. One argument was that the gentry, as long as their income was fairly secure, were less overtly mercenary than "new money" and entrepreneurs, who were more on the Liberal or Gladstone side. Er, does W have anything to do with any gentry? Isn't he more an Enron type?

And there is at least one more explanation of Disraeli turning on Peel. Either he or Gladstone (both Tories at the time) were going to take over as leader. If the party stayed as it was, Gladstone would win. By fracturing the party as he did, dooming it to defeat for decades, Disraeli at least had a party he could lead, and therefore had some chance of becoming Prime Minister some day.

A young Salisbury (Lord Rober Cecil at the time) criticized the Derby-Dizzy Tory party for having no principles at all--or no clear disagreements with Gladstone, other than the malt tax. (I'm not sure, I think this was a last trace of the "protect farmers against free trade" idea). The book I recently borrowed on Salisbury pointed out that Dizzy and Derby had to protect the interests of the Tory party; Cecil was concerned about the integrity or consistency of the conservative movement. Gelernter in a way admits all this:

Disraeli created the new Conservative party in opposition--and while he was at it, created the modern idea of an "opposition party." Blake calls him "perhaps the first politician systematically to uphold the doctrine that it is the duty of the Opposition to oppose. Indeed, he might be said by this practice to have established a precedent on which all subsequent Opposition leaders have acted."


No matter what the issue, if the government was pro, Disraeli felt obliged to be con. "Above all maintain the line of demarcation between parties," Disraeli said, "for it is only by maintaining the independence of party that you can maintain the integrity of public men, and the power and influence of Parliament itself." He believed that a party must stand for a consistent, coherent worldview--not for an incoherent parade of tactical decisions with no overarching purpose or underlying philosophy. A party in the age of expanding democracy must write its principles in bold block letters, plainly and clearly. (Not a bad idea even today.)


But there were two reservations. Disraeli saw his duty as opposition, never obstruction; never to prevent the House from voting. Furthermore, when the nation was at war, the opposition was duty bound to support the war effort. Disraeli disliked the Crimean War and said so, but assured the House that no English general fighting abroad would face any opposition effort "to depreciate his efforts and to ridicule his talents" so long as he was in charge.


I must say it's neat the way Gelernter gets a shot in at Kerry like that, but there is still an obvious question: which was it? Cunningly being con whenever the government was pro, so as to make headlines that said party, party, party? Or some noble consistency of principle, refusing to bend to political pressures?

Sacred tradition, "knowing what we are fighting for," versus intellectual principles or fads? In the case of the U.S., respect for Founding Fathers and the Constitution rather than theories about progress that undermine both the Constitution and old-fashioned patriotism? I can see all this applying to Reagan, especially when the actual wars that result are mentioned. One book on Victorian Britain says Disraeli the Imperialist ended up with Cyprus; Gladstone the anti-Imperialist got Egypt (partly because of hot-headed generals). Reagan talked about fighting nobly, forever, never perhaps actually making sacrifices at home; and attacked Grenada. He famously pulled out of Lebanon when a couple of hundred marines were killed. This I think is real Toryism, harking back to ancient Sparta: in principle being willing to fight when there is the right mix of patriotism, tradition, the sacred, and a small target. But mostly practicing real patriotism by staying home, and looking after things at home. (Update: or of course fighting on a big scale out of anger, fear, or a combination of the two).

I can't help thinking W is a different kettle of fish. Has he ever actually quoted from a speech by any previous president? (Except the FDR phrases the other day)? Has he referred to the Constitution or the Founding Fathers? Of course, he barely refers to any kind of book, or historical or geographical reference, at all. Partly I guess this is the gentleman in him. Like his father, he doesn't want to pretend to know things he doesn't know. One can find this a relief compared to the chatter of intellectuals. But is it enough?

Gelernter is obviously concerned that the fashionable teaching of intellectuals undermines patriotism, and this is especially disastrous after 9/11. One might say 9/11 revealed that conservatives had been too isolationist (perhaps even, although they won't admit it now, too obsessed with Clinton's penis); but the liberals are in worse shape in that they can't see a reason to fight even in the wake of 9/11. The patriotism of Tories may be ineffective, but it is seldom or never in question; the patriotism of liberals is constantly at war with their high-brow intellectualism. Once again, W is the right person for the job because he is so totally free of the taint of the humanities as they are taught at universities today.

Intellectuals have been willing to depart from the text of the Constitution in order to advance their favourite social programs. Bush, perhaps following Reagan, sees the Constitution as a potential obstacle to the activities of the military and the para-military. What harm could result? Bush and his team might torture "outsiders"--either members of radical organizations, or people who live in countries that practically no one can find on a map. The intellectuals might teach young people their country is not worth fighting for.

Well, it's an argument.

Gelernter says conservatives are motivated by pride--recognizing that they have a right to patriotic pride--whereas their liberal opponents, along with radical totalitarians, are motivated by shame. I guess he means American patriots today should be like British patriots in Disraeli's time--emphasizing the positive in one's own country's wars. Even if individual wars don't go well, or excesses are committed, we should be confident that we are on the side of progress?

Isn't it possible that historians will say the U.S. invasion of Iraq was a result of anger and fear, rather than simply patriotism roused by tyranny, as with Britain in 1939? Gelernter re-states in a new way the argument that all decent people knew in their hearts what to do after 9/11, and Bush actually had the guts to do it. Critics are Hamlet-like (at best); vacillating as to whether to do the right thing or not. I would agree that real Democrats including Kerry seem to lack vision, but isn't it possible to argue (paraphrasing Goldwater) that aggressiveness in the service of vague or over-ambitious ends is no virtue, and hesitation in the service of deliberation is no vice?

Disraeli's foreign policy: the defence of Turkey against Russia seemed to many people at the time a nut-bar obsession--almost proof of Disraeli's eccentricity, if not madness. Gelernter says that post-World War II, we can all be grateful that Disraeli kept Russia out of Constantinople (now Istanbul). I'm no expert, but the same book I've referred to also says the Brits debated about Afghanistan in the 19th century as if they never looked at a map (and Disraeli was famous for his lack of research on practically any subject on which he wrote or spoke). Today Russia wants Afghanistan! they would thunder. Tomorrow: Constantinople! That's actually one hell of a march, over mountains and other rough country. How many armies have ever done it? Wouldn't Russia have faced obstacles in trying to do it, including a Britain which had (perhaps) drawn a line at a more reasonable spot? Not only that, but they would also argue: after Constantinople, the Suez Canal! Isn't that another terrible march?

Even if the Tsars held Constantinople in 1900, does that mean Istanbul would have been Communist post-World War II? There are a lot of ifs in there.

Disraeli propped up the Ottoman Empire, the notorious "sick man of Europe". He expressed no sympathy for any people who wanted their freedom from any of the old empires. When Gladstone campaigned in behalf of the Bulgarians, Disraeli laughed.

Er, weren't the Arabs oppressed by the Turks? "Nor can we understand today's radical Islamic terrorism and totalitarianism (totalitarians being terrorists who have already got what they want) without understanding the central role of defeat and shame." Yikes! Did Disraeli contribute to the "root causes" of 9/11?

Randolph Churchill: Again, from memory. Churchill's old man and Joseph Chamberlain had sat on opposite sides of the House (Tory and Liberal, respectively). Chamberlain actually had a reputation as a socialist in his younger days. Gladstone proposed Home Rule for Ireland, and he bet all his chips on his proposal. His Cabinet and Caucus held together reasonably well, and he had some support in the country, but Churchill and Chamberlain together campaigned hard to keep the northern counties of Ireland (Ulster) in the UK. They had no hesitation in approving of violence against the government. "Ulster will fight, and Ulster will be right."

Probably Gladstone was wrong to make no provision for these Irish Protestants who had actually been planted there by the British government. On the other hand, Churchill and Chamberlain probably practised some of the most reckless and dangerous demagoguery a modern democracy has seen. They surely did as much as was humanly possible to keep Northern Ireland boiling, as it boils, in a way, to this day. Mystic chords of memory? Sacred tradition? Remembering what unites us racially and culturally, not like those nasty modernist intellectuals? I guess so.

Compassion. Many people have noted that it was the Tory party in Victorian Britain which passed some of the first labour-standards type legislation, as well as legislation to help the poor, working or not. Gelernter works in references to "compassionate conservatism" here, linking Disraeli to Bush. My understanding is that Disraeli, in his usual impromptu fashion, to win votes both in the House and in the country, protected workers in factories, which were mostly owned by Whigs or Liberals. He did little or nothing about coal mines, which were mostly owned by Tories. I don't know if "No Child Left Behind" is working or not. Faith-based initiatives may bring some good results. Bush's immigration reform is partly a way to welcome a lot of have-nots and give them an opportunity to get ahead.

Tories are on the right. They want to protect the privileges and wealth of those who have these things, in the belief that these are deserved, or at least as well-deserved as anything in this world. To win elections they have to somehow appeal to some of the non-rich and non-privileged. Fortunately, a modern economy provides an opportunity to rise to many people, so Tories by defending the free market can favour established opportunities and systems, rather than simply established privileges. Still, there is sometimes a need for circuses to make up for the shortage of bread: and mystic chords of memory, especially focussed on a war against a small enemy, have been known to do the trick.

It's just a bit sneaky for Gelernter to argue that Bush is supported by anyone with a combination of morality and a backbone, and to wheel out as authorities not only Winston Churchill (who might indeed have enjoyed the invasion of Iraq) but Disraeli and others. In a way he takes the most dubious but edifying parts of Disraeli's rhetoric at face value, and uses it as a club against Bush's critics today. Much detail is lost along the way.

UPDATE: I wish I had said that: Jesse Walker on Hit and Run: "Those modern comparisons are to be expected, I suppose, since the article's not-particularly-hidden agenda is to present a creation myth for Weekly Standard-style conservatism."

Social Security: Must be Almost Bedtime

This is an issue on which I have no expertise, I probably have nothing interesting to say, and it is really up to Americans anyway.

But then if I never blogged about issues meeting those three criteria (cough)....

I think I'm beginning to understand.

In about 20 years, if nothing changes, Social Security will begin to run a slight deficit, which, if benefits don't change, will have to be made up somehow. Tax hikes (including changes in the contributions at various salary levels) and debt are the main alternative to cutting benefits. None of these changes would have to be drastic--even in 20 years--to keep the program "in the black."

The projected date at which problems like this begin to occur has been continually pushed back by experts. So the problems might not occur even in 20 years.

At any time in the next 20 years, it would quite easy to put off these problems for at least another significant period.

That's why honest defenders of change are now admitting that there is no crisis, and may not be one in the lifetime of anyone now living. Certainly there is no indication the program will be broke, busted, with nothing left for the retirement of an Iowa farmer who is now 25. So someone ... er ... lied.

A separate issue is whether a quite different program would actually be better--more like a retirement plan you manage yourself. There would be a greater potential upside but also (the way such things go) a greater potential downside.

As I recall, one poll shows that young people think Social Security will actually not cover them when they retire, so it will do no harm to make drastic changes. Hmmm... Could it be that they think the boomers will screw up everything important, if they haven't done so already? Could this because of their more general view that boomers are self-centered and think only of their own short-term benefit?

I know, the environment. But as soon as their kids grew up, the boomers started driving SUVs.

Turnout in Iraq

I mentioned to my class last night that it is difficult to believe specific or precise turnout numbers for the Iraq election. My understanding is that there has not been a real census in the country for decades. Even the usual figures for the whole population--60% Shiite, 20% Sunni Arab, and 20% Kurd--are estimates at best. Who would have a list of eligible voters? Yet we are told that there was exactly 57% turnout--a comparison of the actual votes counted to...what, exactly?

And then I get home and read this (via Alterman).

Finally, on Thursday night, John F. Burns and Dexter Filkins of The New York Times reported that Iraqi election officials have quietly "backtracked, saying that the 8 million estimate had been reached hastily on the basis of telephone reports from polling stations across the country and that the figure could change."


Then, in Friday's paper, Burns and Filkins noted that one election commision official was "evasive about the turnout, implying it might end up significantly lower than the initial estimate." They quoted this official, Safwat Radhid, exclaiming: "Only God Almighty knows the final turnout now." They revealed that the announcement of a turnout number, expected to be released this weekend, has been put off for a week, due to the "complex" tabulation system.


I'll be delighted if that figure, when it is officially announced, exceeds the dubious numbers already enshrined by much of the media. But don't be surprised if it falls a bit short. The point is: Nobody knows, and reporters and pundits should have never acted like they did know when they stated, flatly, that 8 million Iraqis voted and that this represents a turnout rate of about 57%.


Once again, this has got to be at least partly very good work on the part of the Bush White House. Nobody knows how many eligible voters there are; the media will be thirsty for a number, any number; so make one up. More amazingly, it is reported as gospel by absolutely everyone.

Surprisingly Sober Bush

I'm not really making a bad joke about Bush's "drinking 'til he was 40" story--although he kind of referred to it himself in the SOTU. I mean that the tone of this speech was a surprise. He was more giddy or dreamy in the Inaugural--when the outcome in Iraq, at least according to many observers, was still very much in doubt. Now that things are going well there, he can calm down. He doesn't promise to make war on a lot of countries, he focusses on the Middle East (on Syria and Iran in particular), and he makes it clear he will work closely with pseudo-democracies Pakistan and Egypt. On social security, Kaus praises him for being open to a number of options, in such a way that he can take credit for almost any real reform that actually occurs.

Immigration reform--which his core doesn't like. Anti-gay marriage and pro-life messages, but nothing over the top. Instead of helping with AIDS in Africa, now he wants to help African-Americans--and something about gangs and the inner city, with Laura in charge. Reduced spending to balance the budget--isn't that what his critics have been demanding?--several rather clever references to FDR. The Bushies have done smart political work before, but this may be the best yet.

U.S. Imperialism

President Bush: "In the long term, the peace we seek will only be achieved by
eliminating the conditions that feed radicalism and ideologies of
murder."

"And because democracies respect their own people and their
neighbors, the advance of freedom will lead to peace."

This is bit more sober than what he said in the Inaugural, and it actually articulates the Bush Doctrine a bit.

Michael Young has reviewed three books on U.S. imperialism, and the one that interests me the most--the one I want to read, in fact, is Colossus: he Price of America's Empire, by Neill Ferguson.

Ferguson's creativity is emancipating. An inescapable conclusion about the modern Middle East is that indigenous liberal reform has been a spectacular illusion. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. As Arab countries embarked on post-colonial independence, they became less free. Most Arab civil societies have been bludgeoned into silence by their regimes, with even the more representative systems denying their citizens true political participation.


Ferguson, positing the need for a liberal American empire, suggests a possible mechanism for change from the outside, even as he wonders whether the U.S. is up to the task. And while there has been much denigration of the notion that democracy and free markets can be imposed, Ferguson suggests it is indeed possible. More pertinently, the 9/11 attacks underlined how the success of this ambition in the Middle East is intimately tied to U.S. national security.


Ferguson is known for the line that "America is an empire in denial," which sums up his thoughts fairly well. Like Perle and Frum, he aims to stiffen America's back at a time of volatility, particularly in Iraq. But more important, Ferguson wants to make the U.S. conscious of its imperial destiny.


"I believe the world needs an effective liberal empire and that the United States is the best candidate for the job," Ferguson writes. But he is skeptical that the Americans will play along, warning, "For all its colossal economic, military and cultural power, the United States still looks unlikely to be an effective liberal empire without some profound changes in its economic structure, its social makeup and its political culture."


This is Ferguson's gentle way of saying that the Americans aren't cut from imperial cloth. As Iraq has shown, they're not good at holding overseas territories (though they seize them quickly enough), have developed no effective imperial governing class, seem to believe what they say when promising "liberation" to peoples they have conquered, and have a tendency to become impatient to leave once the bullets start flying and American blood is shed.


I've said before that Americans act as though they don't want to leave home. If they do go to a foreign country, they act like they want to go home again as quickly as possible. The Brits always had some people who, rightly or wrongly, positively wanted to "go native," as well as a group, probably larger, that simply spent so much time in the colonies, they no longer felt at home "at home". I don't think this happens to Americans. One result is their desire to build both democracy and markets--things they can be proud of--as quickly as possible, and then get out--or at least, withdraw to a remote base in the desert. Another result is probably the tendency to lose interest if things start to go south. There is the problem of finding people to work with who speak the relevant languages. And then, perhaps, a tendency to rely on paramilitary forces, and even torture, in what is admittedly foreign territory.

Young says Ferguson sugar-coats how the Brits actually operated in India and other places. And: "American behavior in the Philippines, for example, is hardly something one would want the U.S. to repeat."

Still: I said a long time ago that the Americans are likely to be better and more enlightened imperialists than the Brits were; and who else would you even compare them to?


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