U.S. Allies I: Pakistan
There have been several items of interest in recent days having to do with governments who are the allies of the U.S., and who might become allies. I will try to deal with several of these over the next little while.
Pakistan: Pervez Musharraf
The Toronto Star has a story today on the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan--closest to Afghanistan. A Moslem fundamentalist coalition won elections there a year ago, and now the new provincial government is acting more and more like the Taliban--although leaders insist they will be less violent or extreme.
How did this happen? According to the article:
"Most analysts fault President Musharraf for creating the conditions that allowed the Islamists to make a breakthrough in the parliamentary elections.
"Previously, religious parties were considered a fringe movement, capable of massing extremists for street protests, but never capturing more than 10 or 15 per cent of the vote. That changed when Musharraf sidelined the major secular parties, banning the candidacies of his two main rivals in exile, Pakistan People's Party leader Benazir Bhutto, and Pakistan Muslim League chief Nawaz Sharif (whom he ousted in a military coup four years ago).
"Encouraged by the military, the various religious parties agreed not to run candidates against one another in the same constituencies. By avoiding a split in the vote, and exploiting local resentment against America's war on the Taliban, the new coalition won a two-thirds majority of seats.
"Foreign diplomats and local analysts say Musharraf has opened a Pandora's box in Pakistani politics. The religious parties that the army had expected to be compliant are confronting him with their sharia strategy.
'The president was so hellbent on destroying the two (mainline) parties that he didn't realize the consequences of fragmenting the secular vote,' says Aamer Ahmed Khan, editor of The Herald newsmagazine.
"Now, Musharraf is vowing to block the province's plans for sharia if they impinge on federal jurisdiction. But the mullahs are not intimidated."
So we have a case of Musharraf deliberately weakening his main "secular" opposition--forces that have actually proved themselves capable of taking over the country--and inadvertently strengthening Taliban-like Islamic fundamentalism. How far will this go? Some leaders of the new coalition were known as secular politicians until very recently: they are growing beards, and supporting various crackdowns under sharia, in order to work with more extreme elements. That's where the votes (apparently) are.
More troubling possibilities appear elsewhere. The BBC gives a picture of Musharraf dealing with "extremists" both on the Afghan frontier and in Kashmir. Musharraf's own line is that he is much more secular and moderate than these "other" people, so the West had better deal with him--the alternatives could be a lot worse. The U.S. has bought this, giving him at least a billion dollars. There is a troubling sense, however, that he is not simply pushing back against extremism as best he can: he is using it to get what he wants: aid from the U.S., concessions from India over Kashmir, and possibly the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan. (Pakistan was one of the few countries that recognized the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan).
Christopher Hitchens in Slate comments briefly on Bernard-Henri Levy's new book on the killers of Daniel Pearl in Pakistan. The title of the Slate piece is "Inside the Islamic Mafia," and much of the piece could be interpreted as pro-Bush when it comes to the War on Terror. There is a lawless international threat; 9/11 was an example of its work; and so was the killing of Pearl. Bush is at least generally right in his approach; his critics, by contrast, are probably sentimentally assuming that there is some Arab nationalist movement or Islamic movement that has legitimate grievances and can be appeased by a solution of issues such as "Palestine." These same people, roughly of the left, probably did not care about the Moslems in Bosnia, or else they critized what the U.S. did to help those people.
The more troubling aspect of Hitchens' piece, however, comes when he reports on clear suggestions in Levy's book that Musharraf's secret police were directly implicated in the killing of Pearl; Musharraf may not be entirely innocent of that crime; and even though Musharraf now seems to be collaborating with the U.S. by giving up significant numbers of fairly high-ranking Al Qaeda fighters, it seems possible that he is simply doing what he has to do to assuage U.S. suspicions. Hitchens says of a recent high-profile arrest: "Many words of praise were uttered, in official American circles, for the exemplary cooperation displayed by our gallant Pakistani allies. But what else do these allies have to trade, except al-Qaida and Taliban suspects, in return for the enormous stipend they receive from the U.S. treasury? Could it be that, every now and then, a small trade is made in order to keep the larger trade going?"
Daniel Pearl may have been killed because he was a threat to Musharraf: "His inquiries had at least the potential for exposing the Pakistani collusion and double-dealing with jihad forces, in much the same pattern the Saudi Arabian authorities have been shown to follow--by keeping two sets of books, in other words, and by exhibiting only one set to Americans." The horrible details of Pearl's killing, including the emphasis on the fact that he was a Jew, may have been for the benefit of the gullible.
Musharraf's real plan may be to put the Taliban back in power in Afghanistan, and even to re-build Al Qaeda in some discreet way. Hitchens makes it clear that if any "reputable," more or less pro-U.S. government, is more closely tied to the terrorist form of Islamism than Pakistan, it is Saudi Arabia.
A Saudi lawyer is quoted on how Islamism can be manipulated by people who are not particularly pious: because there are true believers in the world, fortunes and careers can be made by manipulating them, threatening to turn them lose on the world, and actually turning them loose on certain enemies.
In short, the most interesting question Hitchens raises is whether the U.S. is demonstrating any skill in distinguishing its friends from its enemies.
Update: see also the Globe and Mail on Friday . Musharraf just visited Canada. He gives a plausible performance as someone who wants the same things the U.S. does: crack down on Al Qaeda, prevent the Taliban from taking over in Afghanistan. He even urges Canada along with other countries to do more in Afghanistan, saying that if Hamid Karzai falls, there will be chaos. This article, however, which generally gives Musharraf's own view, also offers some hints that Pakistan has not done everything possible to secure the border with Afghanistan, or to defeat the Taliban.
Update: Musharraf has made some comment to the effect that Daniel Pearl "got over-involved," or looked too closely at "extremists". Reaction here and here.
Update: it occurred to me after finishing this that I totally neglected the "obvious" things, that everyone mentions: Musharraf did not exactly come to power by democratic means (he led a successful coup); he does not seem in any hurry to restore elections; and he at least tolerates the madrassahs or religious schools, a significant minority of which teach violence and hatred of the West.
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