Seeking Answers on the War on Terror

In my view, neither defenders nor critics of Bush are quite capturing what is new in the Bush doctrine.

Rich Lowry:

For me, the most strategically compelling reason for the Iraq war was always that it would break-up the axis of radicalism in the Middle East and make it possible to re-orient the region around something better--an axis of decency, running from Turkey to the new Iraq to Jordan to Israel. But this geo-political case for the war was always difficult to make in political argument and it also seemed an awfully risky justification for war, since you were hoping for something of a bankshot--that the invasion of Iraq would eventually affect the political feel of the entire region. But, lo and behold, it's happening before our eyes! I never imagined it would happen so quickly. Bush gets a lot of the credit, for his stick-to-itiveness and his audacity. He has also, finally, gotten some breaks in the Middle East, with the death of Arafat and the Syrian over-reaching in Lebanon sparking the Cedar Rebellion. Yes, the Middle East could still disappoint. Perilous days still await us in Iraq. But it seems increasingly clear that the Middle East will never be the same, and that's a marvelous thing.

About all the Bush critics can say is: positive developments in different countries have different causes, many of them not derived from Bush actions; Bush himself was not pushing as hard for elections in Iraq as Sistani was; the apparently positive developments in the Middle East may lead to instability or more of a role for Hezbollah, etc. See Kevin Drum here.

Someone, I think on the Corner, summarized the Bush view going in to Iraq as something like: give the whole region a hit, and see what happens. By any sort of traditional diplomacy or just war doctrine, this seems crazy or immoral. But I think it has to be admitted that Bush has been both extraordinarily focussed, and extraordinarily flexible. Focussed in that the regimes that seem most likely to support Islamic terrorism should be made to feel they are in trouble. It may still seem a bit odd that Iraq came right after Afghanistan, but that may bear on the flexibility. The Bushies have offered a number of different pretexts for what they were doing--but they were always willing to sacrifice any pretext except for the biggest one, "security of the U.S. homeland," at any time. Similarly they were prepared to see Iraq end up as something considerably less than a full-fledged democracy, as long as it was less of a threat, more pro-American, or simply a home to a number of U.S. military bases. One could argue that in a deep sense they never cared very much about Iraqis, Kuwaitis or Saudis, and in a way that is true. Yet it also seems true that they truly believed that it is only by bringing some kind of liberation from tyranny to a lot of people, in a lot of countries, that the U.S. could achieve security for itself.

The driving motive has been self-interest, driven by fear and anger--a desire to make Americans at home safer. The almost fantastic claim is: greater security can be achieved, but only by transforming a significant part of the world, if not the whole world. I'll have to find some links, but there are statements, including Bush's this year, that Americans cannot be free unless the whole world is free. The execution, more sober than the grandest policy statements, but still partly based on wishful thinking, is in fact intended to transform the Middle East. And that seems to be working.

It's still possible to argue that a nutty group of ideologues gained unprecedented influence, and partly by luck, they are succeeding much more than "realists" are likely to predict. But the ideologues have probably learned from recent history. I told my class recently that the world can change dramatically, and I still remember the fall of Communism in Europe--once it started, it all happened very fast, as if a house of cards simply collapsed. (Some of the students were nice enough to point out that they are too young to remember this).

The neo-cons will argue that the fall of Communism didn't "just happen"--some pushing from Reagan helped. In a more bipartisan spirit, one might mention the Helsinki Accord, and the different ways in which it was pushed by Carter and Reagan. So in the wake of 9/11, the neo-cons wanted to push again, and see what happened.

It is still a bit awkward to describe the Bushies as correct in their predictions, when they seem to have been taken by surprise by everything that has happened, good and bad.

1. In Afghanistan, the warlords returning to their unpredictable and unreliable ways--including allowing many al Qaeda activists to escape, apparently because of bribes that were paid.
2. The fact that al Qaeda has been able to survive and grow--perhaps partly because Musharraf is only half-heartedly pursuing them in the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
3. The quickness of the success of the "strictly military" operation in Iraq.
4. The looting/collapse of law and order.
5. The strength and spread of the insurgency.
6. The difficulty in recruiting and training Iraqi police and military.
7. The role and power of the Grand Ayatollah Sistani.
8. The relative uselessness of U.S. heroes: Adnan Pachachi, who was Bush's guest at the 2004 State of the Union, and was unable to win even a seat for himself in the recent election; Iyad Allawi, Interim Prime Minister, who did much worse than he expected; and Ahmed Chalabi, who has lost out in his campaign to be the prime minister-delegate on behalf of the largest Shiite group.
9. Sistani dictating that: even though the U.S. military presence will be required for some time, elections couldn't be postponed.
10. Positive results of elections--including the increasing visibility of Iraqi security forces.
11. The cost of all this for the U.S. to achieve goals that may or may not directly benefit Americans in their homeland.

UPDATE: I was thinking of Gerard Baker in the Times of London:

Ignoring, fortunately, the assault from clever world opinion on America�s motives, its credibility and its ambitions, the Bush Administration set out not only to eliminate immediate threats but also to remake the Middle East. In the last month, the pace of progress has accelerated, and from Beirut to Kabul.

[snip]

But what was clear to the bold foreign policy strategists in Washington was that the status quo that existed before September 11 could no longer be tolerated. Much of the Muslim world represented decay and stagnation, and bred anger and resentment. That was the root cause of the terrorism that had attacked America with increasing ferocity between 1969 and 2001.

Baker is also the source of the quote I referred to:

As a foreign policy thinker close to the Administration put it to me, in the weeks before the Iraq war two years ago: �Shake it and see. That�s what we are going to do.� The US couldn�t be certain of the outcome, but it could be sure that whatever happened would be better than the status quo.

Link via The Corner (also Instapundit, who liked the Monty Python reference).

Sun Mar 6, 2005 8:18 am MST by robertll | Email Article |

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Seeking Answers on the War on Terror