Pinkerton, Tarcov and the War 

Pinkerton, Tarcov and the War

I've been reading some pieces by Jim Pinkerton (link from The Corner).
Pinkerton worked for Reagan and Bush I. He has been credited with coining the phrase "new paradigm." He probably didn't coin "a thousand points of light" (I think that might have been Peggy Noonan), but he worked on implementing it--with his own distinctive approach. I think this amounted to something like "faith-based initiatives," or "community initiatives."

His vision in his 1996 book, What Comes Next, has been
described as libertarian, emphasizing market-based solutions including vouchers, but also admitting the need for communities, and making room for religion.

It has been pointed out that Pinkerton was known for his disagreements with others in the Bush Administration.

He has become critical of Bush II on the Iraq War, and in this recent piece he rehearses some of the charges against the neo-cons.

Like Don Quixote, he suggests, they have read too much, and gone mad or abandoned common sense. He connects Leon Trotsky and Leo Strauss as the two inspirational figures for many people in or supporting the Bush White House. My question: Trotsky and Strauss? My memory from grad school is that Straussians wouldn't even read Trotsky, and I suspect experts in Trotsky didn't know much about Strauss, either.

Pinkerton has obviously picked up on the "Straussians are taking over the world" meme; one example is in the Globe and Mail July 12.

The best response has probably come from my teacher
Cliff Orwin (a link that has not decayed (yet)).

Having said all this, Pinkerton strongly suggests that the only official rationale for the invasion of Iraq that is still standing is "liberation," a humanitarian or compassionate goal that one would associate with...Bill Clinton. This means not only liberation for the Iraqi people themselves, but some kind of improvement in the entire Middle East. So far, I would still say, so good. There is no widespread intifada against the U.S., or the West; regimes friendly to the U.S. have not faced crises, or been overturned; and Afghanistan and Iraq are probably better off than they were. President Bush surely deserves credit for "the road map to peace" between Israel and the Palestinians. My sense is that Sharon is grateful for the overturning of Saddam (which was probably more in the interest of Israel than the U.S.), and that is one big reason he is willing to co-operate.
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Update July 26: I've been reading Steven Den Beste's overview of the war so far. (Link from
Instapundit).
Den Beste is very much pro-war, and he makes the point that the co-operation of Palestinian groups may be owing to the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq.

I haven't been following Den Beste closely, so I don't know how much his view has changed, but he now says Saddam probably had no involvement to speak of in 9/11, and he may have had no WMDs to speak of, either. He did have the intention of acquiring WMD's; he did support anti-Israel terror; and he was seen in the Arab world as a strong man who would stand up to the U.S. Simply ending sanctions and the no-fly zone over Iraq might have caused a repeat of the slaughter of rebels in 1991--this time, with Kurds as the victims. Iraq was an excellent candidate, according to Den Beste, to be the first major Arab country to be reformed, to show that the old tyrannies could be thrown off, Western-style progress is possible, etc.

There is still a lot of fast and loose theorizing here: the whole Arab world, not Islam as such but the fanatical brand of Islamism, the old decaying Middle Eastern tyrannies, the young of the Arab countries--one sweeping statement after another, like Pyle in The Quiet American. Still, there is a rationale here that does not depend on WMDs or a link to 9/11.

Still more update: Josh Marshall seems pleased that he has been right all along--it has been about regime change in a significant part of the Middle East. (Link from Hit and Run ).
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Now there is talk about interventions in Africa. If the U.S. is going to seriously consider intervening wherever someone needs help, it becomes rather urgent to ask: if the U.S. has a motive to go in, does this provide any explanation of what to do once there, or how to get out (the famous "exit strategy")? As Pinkerton points out, this is the kind of debate Bush II pretty well promised to avoid when he ran in 2000. This is what Pinkerton means by the neo-cons having read too much: they can rationalize military actions with fantastic visions of a better future, but they are not realistic as to what is needed here and now.

Pinkerton joins the ranks of those who do not think there is much left of the WMDs (weapons of mass destruction) rationale, nor of the "Link between Saddam and Bin Laden" rationale. On the former, I can't resist highlighting what seems ridiculous. The U.S. is apparently now waiting for the British to confirm that there is solid evidence of WMDs in Iraq--not that mish-mash of rumours that was dished out before. The entire CIA is...standing by. Still waiting. Take it away, Tony Blair.

More seriously, Nathan Tarcov wrote some years ago on the conditions under which the U.S. should use force against other countries. ("Principle and prudence in foreign policy: the founders' perspective," The Public Interest No. 76 (Summer 1984): 45-60). (Tarcov is one of those Straussians, but I doubt he is one who has read too much. He also worked in the Reagan Administration--for one year). Appealing to the principles of the Declaration of Independence, and to statements by a variety of statesmen, Tarcov argues that in principle for the U.S. "only the violation of rights justifies the use of force." In addition to principle, there are prudential judgments to be arrived at, namely "whether to exercise the right forcibly to vindicate vilated rights. There is indeed no right to do so without having conscientiously weighed the costs to all innocent parties, the precedents and consequences, and the power, will, and opportunity to win."

More specifically, assuming the circumstances make this prudent, it is reasonable for the U.S. to come to the aid of a nation that "is in the act of liberating itself," as when the French came to the aid of American revolutionaries, who were already engaged in rebellion. Unless there are clear signs that such a rebellion is underway, however, it is wrong to presume that a foreign people wish to have a different government. Henry Clay said "I would not seek to force upon other nations our principles and our liberty, if they did not want them. I would not disturb the repose even of a detestable despotism."

As Tarcov says, "some would argue that any people subject to despotism can be presumed to will their liberation, whether by an armed vanguard or a foreign intervention." It is essential, however, to wait for some sign that "the people" in question wish for such an outcome: "... precisely because, in the absence of either free elections or resistance, it is difficult to tell whether a people consents to its government, that difficulty cannot automatically entitle a third party to use force on their behalf."

This I think is the real issue as far as the morality of the Iraq war is concerned. Not whether Bush defied the U.N. Security Council--everyone does, when there is something that they want. Bush is remarkable, if anything, for the patience he showed in trying to get Security Council agreement. Not "unilateralism"; each country must and will make its own decisions about foreign policy and war. But whether there was any real indication of consent from the Iraqi people at large for the U.S. (and allied) invasion; that I think is a real question. There has been a somewhat varying cast of characters who are described as a potential governing council, or something. Exactly what was their standing before the invasion? How many people do they speak for? Have they signed any document, remotely resembling the Declaration of Independence, stating what their principles are, what actions they are willing to take, and what sacrifices they are willing to make?

Just to be clear: as far as I can tell, there is considerable evidence now that the U.S. invasion is popular (other than with some Sunnis or Saddam loyalists), or could become popular if there is some improvement in the civil order. But did decision-makers know with any confidence that this would be the case before they went in?

The practical question for the U.S., however, is whether there is clarity as to what U.S. forces are doing in Iraq, what events will be understood to define a success, and how long this will take. Tarcov commented on the U.S. war in Vietnam toward the end of his essay: "...the speeches of American officials during that war were full of reasons why we were fighting. Too many reasons. Was it to build democracy in Vietnam? To stop aggression from the North and prevent Hanoi from imposing a government on the people of the South? Was it to fulfill a pledge? To maintain our credibility? To preserve our strategic position in Asia?....Without clarity in principle, we could not achieve clarity in strategy; the different principles invoked dictated different strategies and required different sets of facts to be true in order to be relevant."

The analogy to Iraq today is clear. Was the U.S. primarily trying to make life better for Israel, in hopes of a new round of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians? If so, once again, so far so good. Was the main goal to liberate the Iraqis? The record to date is probably more mixed--especially since it is not clear the U.S. will accept an Islamic fundamentalist regime in Iraq, even if that is the regime that enjoys the most widespread popular consent. Was the goal to push back Islamic fundamentalism, especially where it becomes fused with terrorism, and reinforce secularism and modernity? If so, the question is whether the U.S., with a military occupation, is making its own causes look good. (U.S. and British forces got into trouble by carrying out a wholesale confiscation of weapons, and violating the privacy of Arab (Moslem) homes).