Ashcroft, Law Enforcement and Terror
Two articles in Slate bring out related issues.
Lee Smith says the terror problem is bigger than Al Qaeda, and different from anything implied by one centralized organization. One point he makes is that Richard Clarke keeps demonstrating he is wrong about this--still focusing on Al Qaeda. Perhaps Clarke has done a lot to give the 9/11 Commission the same wrong or misleading focus?
One implication Smith draws is that law enforcement and the judiciary should not go on a "war footing" when it comes to terror--since this implies something fairly short term. Terrorism should be understood as a long-term problem that may not be significantly resolved for generations. Using "normal" law enforcement against it is not a sign of weakness, but a demonstration of the strength of our institutions. Trials will also allow a range of experts, as well as the public, to learn more about actual terrorist operations--and areas where law enforcement agencies need improvement.
Dahlia Lithwick's argument is similar. The U.S. is only allowing "small fry," accused of taking very small actions in support of terrorism, to go to trial. Everyone who is accused of anything serious faces a military tribunal, or simply a long detention with no trial. Some of the nobodies pleaded guilty and got substantial jail time because they were told that if they did not, they would get the military "combatant" treatment.
Her conclusion:
"But the Bush administration needs to do two things differently, starting now: First, it must stop heralding each of these trials as a determinative battle in the war on terror. It puts too much pressure on prosecutors to behave appallingly, as they apparently did in Michigan. And it bullies possibly innocent defendants into accepting guilty pleas by threatening to designate them as 'enemy combatants.' Second, the administration must try a real terrorist for real acts of terror. Either the Moussaoui trial should go forward, based on real terror charges, with Moussaoui given a meaningful opportunity to defend himself, or Padilla, Hamdi, or Binalshibh should be tried in open court. Reserving the courts for the small-fry sends the message that the Western legal system can only punish the pretty-bad. And treating each pretty-bad guy like he committed the crime of the century sends the message that justice was never really the point in the first place."
Attorney General John Ashcroft seems very much in charge here (although of course it was the President who insisted on the evening of 9/11 that "we are at war"). In light of some of the testimony at the 9/11 hearing, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Ashcroft, like the President, has gone from one extreme to another: from believing that the emphasis on counter-terrorism was simply empire-building by bureaucrats, to believing it is the number one priority--and indeed requires a martial law approach. (As Smith says, following "the model of authoritarian states like Egypt and Algeria").
Is it because he was taken so much by surprise by 9/11--even because he felt, so to speak, foolish, that Ashcroft wants to use extreme measures that (one hopes) are relatively short-term?
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