Imminent Threat
I can't believe the debate about this is still going on.
1. Did President Bush and/or senior officials in his Administration say in 2002 or early 2003 that Iraq posed an "imminent threat" to the U.S., and was this one of the main rationales, if not the main one, for going to war in March 2003?
Glenn Reynolds is still saying: Bush actually said "the opposite," i.e. Iraq was not an imminent threat, in the SOTU 2003.
Here's the actual quote (via Soundfury) from that speech:
"Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike?
"If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option."
Bush didn't quite deny that Iraq was an imminent threat; that is, he didn't say "the opposite". He said: even if an attack is not (quite) imminent, let's attack anyway. The point was that the threat was either really and truly imminent, or close enough, and the argument to invade was the same either way.
If Bush did not believe Iraq was an imminent threat, this at least raises questions about the urgency of invading in March 2003. It also raises questions about "Just War" doctrine. Like all international law, this may very well be bogus. (See Ernest Fortin article cited in a long post here: one problem with any kind of international law may be that all borders of all countries are based in force and fraud). But it would be helpful if a Bush defender would say something intelligent about it.
2. Is it true that Google searches reveal no case where Bush or anyone senior in his administration made the "imminent threat" statement? There's a good chance the word "imminent" is not in the President's vocabulary. One senses that if he saw this word coming on a page or teleprompter, he would fear mixing up "m" and "n".
3. Above all, there were lots of statements by Bush and many high-ranking officials (as well as Tony ("What are you going to do now, boss? Huh? Huh? What are you going to do now?") Blair to the effect that Saddam had lots of WMDs, they were either ready to deploy or could be made ready on very short notice, and this was a threat to the U.S. Probably thanks mostly to Cheney, in order to heighten a sense of urgency, there were significant, Vincent Price-style hints about nukes. Atrios supplies both the ultimate Google search (from Tom Tomorrow) on "We know Iraq has weapons of mass destruction," and a long list of quotes from Bush and others--assembled by the Center for American Progress.
Bush defenders don't exactly give the impression they are up at night trying to figure out how to tell the truth about all this.
Finally, it's not helpful to quote from Kay's interim report: lots of different WMD program related activities, dual use facilities, hidden facilities, facilities ready to get up and running again on short notice, precursors, and all that. Kay himself has quietly but clearly repudiated all the Phantom of the Opera material. See here on the "interim" report, with updates here, here and here.
Update: The classic exchange between President Bush and Diane Sawyer:
"DIANE SAWYER: But stated as a hard fact, that there were weapons of mass destruction as opposed to the possibility that he could move to acquire those weapons still--
"PRESIDENT BUSH: So what's the difference?
"DIANE SAWYER: Well--
"PRESIDENT BUSH: The possibility that he could acquire weapons. If he were to acquire weapons, he would be the danger. That's, that's what I'm trying to explain to you. A gathering threat, after 9/11, is a threat that needed to be de--dealt with, and it was done after 12 long years of the world saying the man's a danger. And so we got rid of him and there's no doubt the world is a safer, freer place as a result of Saddam being gone."
What's the difference between actually having the weapons and being able to acquire them someday?
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