The Pentagon now says there is a "very dynamic situation" in Iraq. I've never been fluent in Pentagon-speak, but I believe this is a fairly chilling way to describe something pretty bad.
If you survey a wide range of sites, there seem to be two Iraqs today. The one directly occupied by U.S. (and coalition) forces is a hostile, frightening place with plenty of random violence--directed not just at coalition soldiers and administrators, but at anyone who is known to be working with them.
MSNBC has a blood-curdling story about a cab driver in Baghdad who claims he spends time "[killing] whores, women who go to the Green Zone and have sex with the Americans." And he has the bloody knife to prove it.
From the Times of London via Hit and Run: "insurgents in Iraq may outnumber U.S. and coalition forces--and many of them are embedded in the Iraqi National Guard.
Via Kevin Drum: there are only four provinces in Iraq where it will be difficult to hold an election on January 30; unfortunately, those provinces contain 50% of the population.
The other Iraq is getting on with life post-Saddam: making money, getting an education, preparing for an election. See this site, which I think it's fair to say puts things as positively as possible.
The bad: From YES! magazine: Editor Sarah Ruth van Gelder interviews Chris Hedges, "veteran New York Times war correspondent":
CHRIS HEDGES: Iraq is a particularly bad situation for combat soldiers and Marines because it is classic insurgency warfare. It's very similar to what soldiers and Marines experienced in Vietnam, what Israeli soldiers experience in Gaza and on the West Bank, and what the French experienced in Algeria.
You have an elusive enemy. You're not fighting a set organized force, the way we were, for example, in the first Persian Gulf War. So you very rarely see your attacker, and this builds up a great deal of frustration. This frustration is compounded by the fact that you live in an environment where you are almost universally despised. Everyone becomes the enemy. And after your unit suffers--after, for instance, somebody in your unit is killed by a sniper who melts back into the slums where the shot was fired from--it becomes easy to carry out acts of revenge against people who are essentially innocent, but who you view as culpable in some way for the death of your comrades.
Robert J. Lifton, who did a lot of studies on the Vietnam War, called these "atrocity-producing situations." It became very easy in Vietnam to shoot down a woman in a rice field as revenge for a comrade who may have stepped on a mine a few hours before.
War always creates trauma. But in counter-insurgency wars, you are constantly on edge. Going down to a corner store to buy a Coca-Cola creates tremendous amounts of anxiety because somebody could come up behind you and put a gun to the back of your head and kill you.
That's what we're seeing in Iraq. The psychological cost--the emotional cost--that we're inflicting on our soldiers and Marines is devastating.
[snip]
SARAH: We tend to think of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as a medical or psychological condition. But your book suggests that there are also issues of morality and identity involved.
CHRIS: I think you raise a good point. Morality does play deeply into that sense of trauma, because when you're in a combat situation (and I think you have to go there to understand), your reactions have to be instantaneous. If you hear a sound behind a door, you don't have time to ask questions, so often you shoot first and ask questions later. And this we have seen in Iraq, where soldiers and Marines at road blocks have fired on cars filled with children and families that they initially feared were hostile.
When you are in a combat situation like that, you realize how easy it is to commit murder, how easy it is to commit atrocity, because you are so deathly afraid--and with good reason. But the consequences are devastating, because what you have done is to shed innocent blood, and often the blood of children. So you bring back not only the trauma of the violence, but that deep darkness that you must carry within you for the rest of your life--that you have been responsible for the death of innocents.
So it isn't just an issue of trauma; it is, as well, an issue of morality. This is a horrible burden to inflict, especially on a young life. It's why war should always be waged as a last resort, because the costs are so tremendous, not only to families who lose loved ones and will spend the rest of their lives grieving, but for those who return and for the rest of their lives bear these emotional and psychological burdens.
This interview was reprinted in the Toronto Star today, but it's not available online at their site.
I'm not going to go through all of Glenn Reynolds' arguments on torture at Instapundit. I gather he is against torture; he does not think the Bush administration has ever authorized actual torture; he thinks cases of torture such as Abu Ghraib were aberrations, contrary to orders; and the debate about torture should not be used to undermine the war effort.
At one point (I can't find it quickly) he quoted with approval a reader or blogger saying: why does it seem the only choice is between the impractical and the unacceptable? "Impractical" means: all sane people know that torture might be "necessary" at times--that is, a decision would likely be made to use it in desperate circumstances, to save one's own people from a lot of suffering and death. And this is true whether or not there is good evidence that torture actually works in the sense of producing reliable information. "Unacceptable" means: we must proceed by recognizable and defensible standards and laws.
I find it hard to improve on Dahlia Lithwick. "Consistently throughout yesterday's testimony, Gonzales chose to be irresponsible, forgetful, and unaccountable on issues that warrant serious intellectual scrutiny."
Lithwick says if the U.S. actually had a senior Al Qaeda leader in custody, and were convinced he actually had information about an impending attack on the U.S., it would make sense to torture him. This implies, however, that the circumstances in which this is true are extremely limited--and so far, presumably, hypothetical. It does not seem that there are very many Al Qaeda people in Iraq; it does not seem that if they can be found, they have necessarily had anything to do with attacks on the U.S. There is all too much evidence that people have been rounded up, willy-nilly, and subjected to "abuse" (at a minimum) in the hope that they would say something useful about the war. The need for this amateurish operation arises from problems with the whole Iraq war: shortage of friendly people who know a lot about the country; shortage of people serving the coalition who speak Arabic or Farsi; inability to tell friend from foe, etc. Does all this amount to a justification for torture?
Senior U.S. officials go back and forth between saying they are fighting Al Qaeda in Iraq, and saying they are fighting "insurgents" who are basically Sunni Iraqis who are loyal to Saddam, or trying to hang on to power that they know will be lost under any kind of democratic rule. If the U.S. is basically intervening in a civil war that has been kindled or re-kindled by the U.S. invasion, which went beyond "decapitating" the regime of a corrupt tyrant and destroyed much of the infrastructure of government, is this a justification for torture?
Lithwick says Alberto Gonzales had an opportunity to explain what the Bush administration is doing the other day. If he had simply said: we know we have terrible enemies out there, and if we find them, it may be some of them must be tortured--he would have received a standing ovation. Instead he hedged on exactly what Bushies will do, in what circumstances. Of course, the President won't necessarily comply with an Act of Congress--but there shouldn't just be pronouncements that "we know better." Of course it isn't simply a matter of complying with the Geneva Conventions, or international law. But what are they saying?
For me this is part of the inarticulateness of the Bush administration. The president himself must be one of the most inarticulate leaders in the history of the English-speaking world. One thing that makes comparisons to Churchill and Lincoln ludicrous is that they were arguably the most articulate such leaders. Bush needs translators like Tony Blair or friendly pundits. So far, they have failed to explain the torture doctrine.
There is a clear sense that the President has very little interest in briefings or full, complex debates on issues. This is not unusual for decision-makers, but he may be at some kind of extreme--especially when you consider what seems to be his complete lack of knowledge of U.S. history, world history, geography, etc.
Lithwick again:
One of Gonzales' most plausible defenses of the "torture memos" is that they represent mere hypothetical speculation--a handful among many radical ideas that were batted around in a broad attempt to arrive at a national policy. On its face, this argument makes sense. No one should be judged on the contents of a single policy memo, devoid of context, prepared at the request of another. We've all written stupid arguments. But one of the tragic flaws in the Bush administration's fantasy "information-gathering" sessions is that the only ideas that get "batted around" come from an echo chamber of lock-jawed evangelists for unlimited executive powers. As the Washington Post pointed out again this week, key administration, State Department, and military officials were routinely precluded from batting around their ideas about wartime exigencies and presidential powers. This wasn't legal theorizing; it was a Federalist Society pep rally.
With a president who is notably incurious, and wants reassurance, the ideologues are able to set up, and then control, an echo chamber. They want maximum flexibility--even if that means flexibility to act without a good or sufficient reason.
UPDATE: As the last link (Wolcott via Atrios) indicates, there is now evidence that the Bushies are considering something like the death squadsor terror squads that were used in Central America in the 80s. The idea would be to intimidate the Sunni population at large, which has proven too pro-insurgency, or insufficiently pro-coalition. Bush defenders seem to be saying: there is no way we would do something terrible like that, but it's perfectly OK if we do.
UPDATE cont'd: Here is the link. As various sites indicate (Hit and Run among others), here is the nut graph on the need to terrorize the whole Sunni population--and after that, I guess, liberate them:
Maj. Gen. Muhammad Abdallah al-Shahwani, director of Iraq's National Intelligence Service...said that the U.S. occupation has failed to crack the problem of broad support for the insurgency. The insurgents, he said, 'are mostly in the Sunni areas where the population there, almost 200,000, is sympathetic to them.' He said most Iraqi people do not actively support the insurgents or provide them with material or logistical help, but at the same time they won't turn them in. One military source involved in the Pentagon debate agrees that this is the crux of the problem, and he suggests that new offensive operations are needed that would create a fear of aiding the insurgency. 'The Sunni population is paying no price for the support it is giving to the terrorists,' he said. 'From their point of view, it is cost-free. We have to change that equation.'
UPDATE II: Kaus seems to think there is a good case that the pro-torture memos circulating around the White House were quite separate from the chain of command at Abu Ghraib--which quite independently broke down, leading to lots of discipline problems in addition to the mistreatment of prisoners. Kaus also thinks torture actually works. He takes fairly seriously the stories that post-Abu Ghraib, the U.S. military is actually officially hamstrung in its interrogations--precluded even from using "good cop/bad cop." But he also asks: if bad things happen (only) when orders are disobeyed--how frequent an occurrence is this? One might add: do conditions on the ground make it more likely?
UPDATE III: Kaus graciously links to Marty Lederman, who is more criticalof a certain Heather MacDonald article (defending the Bushies) than Kaus is.
Lederman says it makes sense that it was the CIA that requested guidance on "how far they could go" with Al Qaeda suspects who were held somewhere other than on foreign soil, and thus triggered the pro-torture memos. If so, at least one of Gonzales' statements at his hearing is "increasingly implausible." The military normally function under far more restrictions, when it comes to torture, than the CIA, most notably the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Contrary to what MacDonald says, it's pretty clear the Pentagon then adopted the CIA guidelines. MacDonald, according to Lederman, fails to explain how practices that have been proved on the part of U.S. personnel are consistent with the law, including the UCMJ; indeed, "she fails even to mention the UCMJ."
The Bushies refuse to explain exactly what they are doing, to whom, for what reason, and how their practices match the laws they profess to be defending and indeed spreading around the world.
I got the papers graded for my course, so naturally I've taken on even more reading. I'm going to have to remember some due dates: I borrowed the Lou Cannon book on Reagan from the public library, and this new one from the University. Generally books I borrow on my faculty card are not due until the end of the school year; I guess the books that belong to specific colleges, with smaller libraries, have tighter timelines.
I'm more and more convinced that the Third Marquess of Salisbury--Lord Salisbury for short--Prime Minister of Britain (with some interruptions) from 1885 to 1902, was a fine essayist--perhaps the Tory Macaulay. Unfortunately for anyone who appreciates his work, there is not much of it and it is out of print. He basically published essays during the time when he needed to work for a living. He was married and starting a family, and he was waiting to inherit title and fortune from his father. In fact, his father didn't approve of his marriage (although it did the son a lot of good), so the famous Salisbury's income was even less than it might have been. Also he had not yet become party leader, which later took a lot of his time. (His father criticized him for writing in too polemical a tone; he replied in a letter that his father knew better than anyone that he had to make a living).
The essays that were re-printed in 1972 (Paul Smith, ed., Lord Salisbury on Politics, Cambridge) focus on domestic politics. There is good stuff here on Gladstone, on how parliament and parties actually work, and on the personalities and issues of Victorian politics. But there is way too much ranting that it would be a mistake to extend the franchise to more voters. As Smith says, Salisbury sounds almost like a Marxist at times--the "artisans," once they have the vote, will think of themselves more and more as an economic class (I guess Marx would say they'll have class consciousness), and then they'll rise up, or demand everything. In some ways his predictions were quite shrewd--that elections would only become more disgustingly shameless and pandering, for example. Of course we can say the sovereign people force candidates to go through a real test, which often seems different from the test of actually leading; but the test is still often meaningful in showing who succeeds, and who fails.
Salisbury was a leader to the "die hards," but he wasn't really one himself. He was always ready to switch from a position that was clearly not going to succeed--perhaps after taking one thorough beating on principle. He also never kidded himself that the traditions he defended were somehow sacred, or even wiser than the progressive alternatives. He pretty much admitted that they represented a hodge-podge of victories of self-interested groups--if not crimes. As the franchise was extended, there was an assumption that this would help the "left wing" parties--but no one really knew, there was almost nothing in the way of evidence. It turned out the Tory party benefitted for decades.
In general I'm attracted to cynical conservatism. Lord Melbourne was a more amazing case. As a Whig he served in the same coalition, and sometimes the same Cabinet, as "Reformers" who were forerunners of the Liberal party. These colleagues of his were "progressive" in wanting to expand the franchise, end economic protection and move to free trade, and eliminate a lot of the benefits of the Anglican Church. Again and again Melbourne would get to his feet and say he was very impressed with the ideas of these people--often young people. They had obviously given a lot of thought to what they were proposing (he might go through their arguments in detail--he was quite bright). As he drew to a conclusion, however, he would say that unfortunately, radical change always does more harm than good. Surely, the reader thinks, this can't always be true.
Something like this thought arises as one reads Salisbury--although he wasn't as cynical as Melbourne.
Anyways, I've found some more of Salisbury's "great" essays, as compared to his "very good ones." A two-volume set was published in 1905 in both London (John Murray) and New York (E.P. Dutton): "Essays by Robert Marquess of Salisbury." I found the volume called "Biographical" before (Vol. I?); now I've found "Foreign Politics" (Vol II?). They are not easy to find, even in a good university library.
A few highlights for now:
The essay on Poland begins like this:
[blockquote]There are few positions more embarrassing than that of men who hold moderate opinions in regard to questions upon which excitement is running high. They rarely escape a thirdsman's proverbial fate. [My note: I think this means the first-place and third--place finisher have a common interest in stopping the second-place finisher; or, someone tells the conqueror "I sacrificed three times, and always with you in mind," and the conqueror replies "but to another god, not to me."]. They are equally obnoxious to the partisans whom they have left behind, and to the partisans of whose extravagance they fall short. They are regarded by each side as combining the demerits of an antagonist and a deserter. Each party equally despises the lukewarm zeal and time-serving temper which can only take up half a cause. The pursuer of the golden mean must be content with the intrinsic value of the intermediate course that he selects. He will win no human sympathy, and must submit to be cast out as crotchety by every enthusiastic mind. An enemy is more tolerable than a friend who advances to your aid encased in a panoply of 'ifs' and 'buts.' It is still more irritating when the lukewarmness of your ally takes the form of historical precision. Nothing can be more aggravating than, at the moment when men are nerving themselves for a death-grapple with an overwhelming foe, to have their bravery subjected to a pedantic literary criticism, and pared down to the standard of a set of pettifogging facts.[/blockquote]
I can't help thinking there is some relevance to Gulf War II: The War on Terror (tympani: boom boom boom). Up until the sentence about historical precision, this passage (complete with the "golden mean") encapsulates the perspective of the gentleman. As Talleyrand said "surtout, pas de zele." I'm also reminded of a line that I think comes from a professor named Chris Kelly: Students are usually either too political, or not political enough, to be interested in political philosophy.
Salisbury goes on to argue that the Polish aristocrats who are trying to get the British and other people to rally to their defence do not have as noble a history as they claim; and Russia hasn't wronged them as much as they suggest.
Some issues are still contemporary: Catherine of Russia conquered a part of Poland, but it was the "Russian" part that shared her, Russian, "Greek" religion, not the "Roman" one of the Poles. In short, she conquered the Orthodox Ukrainians. In his detailed account of the history, Salisbury recounts that the Poles had tried to force the Ukrainians to become Roman Catholic; any who refused to do so were called schismatics. My friend Alex is a "uniate" Ukrainian Catholic who has explained some of this to me. The Ukrainian Catholics are in communion with Rome, but they have been allowed to maintain many Orthodox traditions. (Maybe the "final step" of allowing uniate Ukrainian Catholics came when the Ukrainians lived under more tolerant Austria, rather than the Poles?) When Alex went to a Catholic high school, it was largely a new world to him, and I gather he was pretty much treated as an outsider. As he says wryly, the message that "uniate" practices are accepted has not fully gotten through. He has a strongly held, somewhat unusual sense of Christendom. It really consists of national churches, that do not necessarily follow the detailed pronouncements of any head office. France has a national church which is Roman Catholic; Britain has one that is not. All Christians have in common their first thousand years or so of history, with lots of saints, creeds and prayers to celebrate together. Even some recent saints can be recognized by all Christians--although Rome insists on a kind of "police court" approach to deciding who has been canonized.
But, as Shelley said, I digress.
Poland had a history of aggression against Russia. It had a constitution that made it prone to anarchy, and had actually extended slavery on its own people at a time when other Western countries were moving to abolish slavery of any kind.
Prussian enters the picture: "The whole history of the kingdom was a history of lawless annexation. It was formed of a territory filched from other races and other Powers, and from no Power so liberally as from Poland. Till a recent period [the princes of Prussia] had been Polish vassals." Prussia and Austria together wanted to partition Poland; so Catherine wanted to protect Russia by taking her share.
Salisbury spends a lot of time on the circumstances in which aggression can more or less be morally justified. These certainly go beyond self-defence of the most immediate, er, "imminent" kind. Even the Prussians and Austrians had some justification for invading Poland--fearing disproportionate influence on the part of Russia.
The next essay, "the Danish Duchies," has more on those nasty Prussians--who more or less became the aggressors in both World War I and World War II.
Salisbury, as usual, defends the wisdom and actions of the participants in the Congress of Vienna of 1815--even though it became fashionable among intellectuals to condemn the Congress as a reactionary backward step. He says that neither Austria nor Prussia were considered much of a threat to anyone in 1815:
[blockquote]The old traditions of Austria, and the heterogeneous character of her empire, were thought to be a sufficient security for her pacific disposition; nor can it be said that that expectation has been disappointed. Prussia and the smaller German Powers had given to the minds of politicians of that date a different and a more humiliating guarantee. Their conduct during the Great War had shown so slender an aptitude for self-defence, that the idea of their attempting conquest was too absurd to be entertained. Nor had their patriotism been of that excitable kind which disposes a nation to incur risk for the sake of glory. [I love that... the old Melbourne or Disraeli spirit of subtle invective]. They had allowed themselves to be tossed from one ruler to another....and all these insults had not spurred them into any serious resistance, until bolder races had broken [Napolean's] power, and had made patriotism comparatively safe. The [German] masses, in 1813, fought well: but it was only after Russia had made their task easy; and it was rather against the will than under the guidance of their natural leaders....the ignominious part which Germany played during the Great [Napoleonic] War had the effect of awakening a national spirit which had never existed before. If it had been directed by moderate and practical men, this movement would have been of great service not only to Germany but to Europe....No one would have ventured to predict that the ambition of a United Germany might be as dangerous to [the] peace [of Europe] as the ambition of France or Russia.[/blockquote]
His Lordship didn't live long enough to see the half of it. I love that; I think it is really great writing.
I must admit, I find this amusing. In questioning Alberto Gonzales on Thursday (hearings into Gonzales' nomination to be Attorney General), Ted Kennedy mentioned a threat of drowning as a particularly odious type of torture. Drudge drew attention to this, without comment; it was picked up I think by the Corner: 20:12:12 SENATOR IRONY: Edward Kennedy Grills Gonzalez Over 'Drowning' Torture... *
These techniques included the threat of live burial and waterboarding, whereby the detainee is strapped to a board, forcibly pushed under water, wrapped in a wet towel and made to believe he might drown. The article states that you raised no objection,
For a long time it was rare for Kennedy's name to be mentioned without an immediate reference to "Chappaquiddick." This may be unfair, but it is also unfair that whenever Clarence Thomas retires or dies, the obits will all refer to "sexual harrassment" in the opening paragraph--even though Anita Hill did not, at the time of his nomination hearings, accuse him specifically of sexual harrassment.
Just a quick recall: at best, Ted, driving drunk, drove his car off a bridge. A young woman named Mary Jo Kopechne died inside. The best tesimony seems to be that she survived for a while under water, but Ted made little or no effort to save her, or even to call the police. Instead he walked to a phone, and gathered much of the Kennedy brain trust in order to plan how to get him out of trouble, and what to say to the media.
Among the weird theories that have floated around is that there were two crashes. The first didn't involve water, but left Mary Jo looking pretty bad. So Ted deliberately drove off a bridge, thinking this crash would somehow look better or explain her death better than the first crash. In any case, he may honestly have believed that she was dead by the time he got to the surface of the water; and he may have been too drunk to be of much help. And, er, that would be his defence.
Volkswagen ran ads for the old beetle emphasizing that the car had offbeat advantages. (Since it wasn't particularly big, or powerful, or safe). One series of ads emphasized, for some strange reason, that the Beetle would float--at least for a while. National Lampoon or a similar magazine ran a spoof ad that said: "If Ted Kennedy drove a Volkswagen he'd be President today."
1. The Distant Delegator.
First a line from my new biography of J.D. Rockefeller Sr. (Yes, I have too many books on the go).
[JDR's father relied, at best, on con games and snake oil sales for a substantial part of his income; at worst he was a thief and a rapist.]
"One must ... note his penchant for denial, his potent capacity to filter out uncomfortable thoughts, especially about his father, just as he later deflected criticism of his questionable business behavior. John D. Rockefeller drew strength by simplifiying reality and strongly believed that excessive reflection upon unpleasant but unalterable events only weakened one's resolve in the face of enemies."
This surely has some application to Reagan (and maybe to W). Kuhn writes in amazement that Reagan has cancerous tissue removed, and from then on tried to avoid the subject. If it does come up, Reagan says "hell, I never had cancer--a kind of tissue was removed, and there was cancer in it, that's all...."
Iran-Contra: Kuhn sticks to the official story that Casey and Poindexter between them funnelled money to the contras without the president's explicit say so.
Regan-Baker: James Baker went from Chief of Staff to Secretary of the Treasury, and Regan switched, for Reagan's second term. Regan was probably never very good at maintaining all the contacts he had to--especially with Nancy Reagan and Congress. Yet it took forever to get rid of him--in fact, it took an unsuccessful press conference over Iran-Contra. To what extent was the President clued in, willing to act? For that matter, Nancy had a kind of veto over the president's daily schedule, and Kuhn and a few others knew that her decisions were based partly on astrology. (I still can't tell if he was even more superstitious than her). There's one episode where Howard Baker (who took over from Regan) said the schedule would have to be run by Nancy after the president, and the president was irritated. Didn't he know she was vetting it every day?
2. The Pragmatist.
I think this is all to Reagan's credit. He seemed to know how to sound like a real right-winger, on both economic and social issues, and keep the true believers on side. Yet he would make major decisions in the manner of a centrist: negotiating with the Soviets, trading arms for hostages in Iran despite an avowed principle of never negotiating with terrorists. (Again the denial: he kept saying he was just trying to help the moderates in Iran, in the hopes that they might improve the regime there in general, and freeing the hostages would be one--but only one--possible result). He was severely criticized by conservatives for negotiating with Gorbachev. This was at least partly Nancy's idea--something that would go down in history. (As of course it has done). He is still known as the tax cutter--and he has certainly made it difficult for anyone in the U.S. to raise taxes--but Kevin Drum has shown recently that Reagan actually raised taxes, especially in his last years as President--probably in order to reduce the deficit.
Kuhn says Reagan always insisted on being optimistic: "Never say never" was one of his favourite sayings. Did some of his proposals cross over from idealistic to crazy? Did he simply have the good luck to encounter a Soviet leader in desperate circumstances who was willing to deal? Or is truly stubborn optimism simply a good strategy for a leader--in strictly pragmatic terms?
Reagan appointed moderates to key positions. Kuhn says shrewdly that Reagan wanted to pursue conservative policies, as he had promised, but while listening to all sides.
3. Napping, etc. In a way the silliest stuff, but it keeps coming up. Kuhn says he never saw Reagan take a nap during business hours. On the other hand, there were two meetings with the Pope during which Reagan visibly nodded off. Kuhn explained to the President and First Lady afterward that there must have been something about the Pope's voice that Reagan found particularly hypnotic. On the other hand, was it true that Carter was in the Oval Office early every day, and put in much longer hours than Reagan? Kuhn says he has it from White House staff that Carter would indeed come in early--and then take a nap.
Reagan found any criticism of his movie career absolutely crushing. In his mind, he had worked hard at a career, starting with very little as a boy in the Midwest. He had built on a good voice and affable personality, and learned how to walk, talk and ride a horse as impressively as possible. He worked out every day--long before this was a widespread fashion. He remained conscious of how he looked and dressed at all times--even without the help of his wife and his staff. He wanted to be seen as a great example of American rags to riches, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps.
From my new book by Jim Kuhn.
My favourite so far: the famous movie-watching, Friday and Saturday nights at Camp David.
One evening in Reagan's second term, we watched Kiss of the Spider Woman, the story of a cross-dressing transvestite and his roommate in a Mexican prison. Mike Deaver, who had left the administration by then, had recommended it.
After the movie ended, there was silence for a moment. Then the president stood up from the couch, with a look of irritated disbelief.
"Well," he said, "I would like to know one thing--what the hell has gotten into Mike Deaver since he's gone into the private sector?" He shook his head.
Otherwise Kuhn has more staffer stories. It was Kuhn, it turns out, who persuaded Reagan, against the advice of several senior people, to take off his overcoat as he waited to meet Gorbachev's car on a chilly morning in Geneva. Reagan, Shultz and others were convinced it made no difference, but Kuhn was worried that Gorbachev would have no coat, and Reagan (20 years older) would look old and frail by comparison. Reagan finally complied with Kuhn's suggestion--and Gorbachev got out of his car, all bundled up. The photo that went around the world, at least according to Kuhn, gave the impression that it was Gorbachev who was frail, and couldn't stand the cold. For the rest of the summit, whenever Gorbachev and Reagan were planning their next meeting, Gorbachev would ask "coat or no coat"?
These are obviously the stories Kuhn will tell his grandchildren. Reagan and Gorbachev met privately early in the day, and this meeting went on much longer than planned. Don Regan and Bud McFarlane both thought Kuhn should knock on the door and interrupt so as to get on with the agenda. Kuhn didn't think this was wise. He finally asked for Shulz's advice, and George Shulz blew up at Kuhn as if he was the one who wanted to interrupt. Finally Reagan and Gorbachev emerged, pleased at how the meeting had gone. Instead of 20 minutes, they had met for an hour and twenty minutes--and Kuhn had done his part to ensure they were not interrupted for the sake of a silly schedule. Larry Speakes as press secretary had a habit of inventing quotes for Reagan--making him sound better; and no one really caught on until... Speakes had left for the private sector. But Kuhn had always disapproved of it!
If there is an election in Iraq, and law-abiding Sunnis are under-represented because of the violence, what to do?
Recently, and belatedly, the Bush administration started suggesting some kind of representation for Sunnis that is not based strictly on population, or might represent a group or region rather than simply population. As Kevin Drum says, this seems too late--yet it is a good enough idea that it shows the incompetence of the Bushies that it didn't come up earlier.
Especially since the U.S. provides a model: the U.S. Senate. Every state is equally represented, regardless of population. This may never have made a whole lot of sense in the U.S. It was supposed to help less populous states against more populous ones; it ended up helping to defend slavery, then segregation, and more recently agricultural subsidies. In any case, the Senate is obviously a very powerful legislative body.
When constitution-building was at some kind of fever pitch in Iraq, with serious proposals for the abolition of capital punishment, no right to bear arms, and maybe "economic rights," why wasn't some thought given to representing the major groups in the country, not just population numbers?
Mickey Kaus also has something on "how to include the Sunnis"--one idea is to have a re-vote, as in Ukraine, but Kaus doesn't like that suggestion for Iraq. I posted on the U.S. Senate idea for Iraq a couple of times, months ago. It still seems very difficult to search my old posts.
I just saw on the Corner that Jerry Orbach died. Many of us only really know him from TV and a few movies. But he really became a star on Broadway, singing and dancing. Before his big Broadway career, he was "off off Broadway" in the Fantastics for many years, as "The Narrator." Does that mean he sang "Try to Remember" about a million times?
I saw him interviewed by Bob Costas once. I thought it was an amazing case of a guy who had probably had a pretty interesting life, giving very cryptic, mono-syllabic and non-helpful answers to an interviewer. Costas struggled to keep the interview going. Of course, we've all seen the old-fashioned stage actor being interviewed who tells the polished anecdote about Larry Olivier or someone famousl--a story they've told a million times.
Other deaths in 2004. Jack Lemmon: in Johnny Carson's last weeks on the Tonight Show, he had Lemmon on and they were reminiscing about how they met in New York. They were both young, not working much yet, auditioning all the time, and they would go for coffee or something stronger and share their dreams. Then Lemmon got very dramatic, looked at Carson and said: even in those days I said to myself: Someday this guy is going to be a big star." Carson couldn't resist: "That's funny, I didn't think you were going anywhere." He immediately apologized, said he couldn't resist, etc., but there was a shocked look on Lemmon's face.
Rodney Dangerfield. I love the classic jokes. Tony Pierce was gathering them in his comments for a while. Do the Catskills comics hold up better than others? Jackie Mason has recently had one-man shows that sold out. As he loves to point out, no other comic will do such a long show, that runs so long. They don't even try. Billy Crystal tried to immortalize a Catskills comic in his movie, "Mr. Saturday Night," which fell flat. Yet he is getting tributes not only for the Oscar work, but for being a kind of public mourner--knowing how to show respect, but also when to knock it off, or go back to kidding around. Is Seinfeld really a Catskills comic who aimed at TV and Vegas (thus no blue language) from the beginning?
One of my rants is that Wayne and Shuster have been overrated (not that anyone outside Canada cares). Ed Sullivan booked them many times, and said they were a relief from the comics talking about their mothers-in-law. But I don't think their stuff holds up very well.
Update Jan. 1: OOPS! The action was all on the Indian Ocean. Once again, I lack a global perspective.
The Pacific Ocean got its name because, on so many days, it is beautiful and calm, able to support the lives of millions of people in tropical comfort.
Vasco Nunez de Balboa (1475-1519), Spain.
Spanish conquistador and explorer. He was the first European to see (and stand in the waters of) the eastern shore of the Pacific Ocean, on September 13, 1513. He accomplished this feat after an arduous trek through the jungles of what is now Panama. He claimed the Pacific Ocean and all its shores for Spain, which opened the way for Spanish exploration and conquest along the western coast of South America. But it was the Portuguese explorer, Magellen (not Balboa), who, because its waters seemed so calm, gave this ocean the name "Pacifica" (meaning peaceful).
(via Ask Jeeves)
Unfortunately, the same ocean can also be the source of a disaster like the one we are hearing about.
I guess technology exists to give at least some warning of a tsunami (maybe the Japanese have it?), but this one was kind of a perfect natural disaster. People are on the beach, relaxing, on a beautiful day. Suddenly the water is sucked away from the beach. Everyone is shocked, speculating. Some weird variation on the tide? Something to do with the moon? Then: waves appear, travelling at 800 km/h.
You run like hell, and even if you make it, your loved ones and people around you probably don't. Parents were forced to decide which kids they could hold on to. Incredible.
A terrible aftermath in countries that are mostly very poor. Tourism is a cash business for many of them. Will tourists come back soon?
And a nasty question: to what extent is prostitution a major part of the tourism business in those countries?
A story that never completely goes away. Somebody at a high level authorized abuse and/or torture of prisoners both at Guantanamo and in Iraq. Defenders of the war are apparently confident that it can all be justified as a necessity of war--and it was on a small scale, anyway. Is it so clear that that is what Lincoln, Churchill, or Polk would have said? Princess Leia? Gandalf?
Isn't there at least a possibility, somewhere on the horizon, that Democrats could campaign on this issue and make things difficult for Bush in 2007?
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